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This is an appeal from a verdict reached at the Fourth District Court, in Provo, 
Utah County, Utah, dated December 3, 2007 (Case Docket 16, attached as Ex. 2) The 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
Statement of Issues and Standard of Review 
L Did the trial court commit reversible error when it ruled that Robert Kearl was 
not entitled to a new trial based on juror misstatements and omissions in response 
to voir dire questions, and when the Court did so without questioning the juror 
about his misstatements and omissions? 
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-936 (Utah 1994). This issue was preserved in court by Plaintiffs 
motion for new trial on December 10, 2007 (Case Docket 16, attached as Ex. 2). The 
Court denied the motion on February 20, 2008 (Case Docket 17, attached as Ex. 2). 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error in determining that Defendant could 
enter evidence not previously disclosed to Plaintiff or the Court, that Robert Kearl 
was not entitled to a new trial and that sanctions should not be entered against 
Defense Counsel based on Counsel fs misconduct, or by determining that 
Plaintiff's Counsel could not argue to the jury what misconduct caused certain 
evidence to be withdrawn? 
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36. This issue was preserved in court through Plaintiffs objection 
to Defense Counsel's line of questioning using previously undisclosed evidence on 
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November 7, 2007 (Partial Tr. of Jury, R.948, p. 5, attached as Ex. 11). On November 9, 
2007, Plaintiff moved that the exhibit in question be removed from juror consideration 
and that the Court instruct the jury as to why the exhibit was removed and of Defense 
Counsel's misconduct (Partial Tr. of Jury Trial R.948, pp. 21-24, attached as Ex. 1). 
Finally, Plaintiff moved for a new trial and sanctions against Defense Counsel on 
December 10, 2007 (Motion for New Trial and For Sanction R.820). 
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error by allowing Dr. Craig Smith to testify, 
and by not allowing Plaintiff to tell the jury that Colorado Casualty Insurance 
hired defense expert Dr. Craig Smith? 
This issue presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36. This issue was preserved in Court on October 12,2007, 
through Plaintiffs Motion in Limine objecting to the testimony of Dr. Smith and 
requesting permission to reveal evidence to the jury that Colorado Casualty Insurance 
hired Dr. Craig Smith (R. 400). 
4. Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing to enter its disqualification 
after holding an ex parte meeting with Defense Counsel during the trial? 
This issue presents a question of law that is reviewed f6r correctness. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36. This issue was preserved in Court through Plaintiffs Motion 
that the Court Enter a Disqualification on February 22, 2008, and Withdrawal of Motion 
to Enter Disqualification and request that the Court enter disqualification on its own 
motion on March 3, 2008 (R. 881, 928). 
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Constitutional or Statutory Provisions 
Utah Code Annotated, §58-60-113: 
Evidentiary privilege for mental health therapists regarding admissibility of an 
confidential communication in .. .civil.. .proceedings is in accordance with Rule 
506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59: New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to 
all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following 
causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new 
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order 
of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47: Jurors. 
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is selected an oath must be administered to 
the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the 
matter in issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the 
evidence and the instructions of the court. 
(1) Communication with jurors. There shall be no off-the-record communication 
between jurors and lawyers, parties, witnesses or persons acting on their behalf. 
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Jurors shall not communicate with any person regarding a subject of the trial. 
Jurors may communicate with court personnel and among themselves about topics 
other than a subject of the trial. It is the duty of jurors Hot to form or express an 
opinion regarding a subject of the trial except during deliberation. The judge shall 
so admonish the jury at the beginning of trial and remind them as appropriate. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37: Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; 
sanctions. 
(b) Failure to comply with order 
(b)(2) Sanctions by Court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey an 
order entered under Rule 16(b) [pretrial orders] .. .the Court in which the action is 
pending may take such action in regard to the failure as are just, including the 
following: 
(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other facts to be established for the purposes of 
the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order: 
(b)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated 
claims or defenses or from introducing designated mattbrs in evidence; 
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order 
is obeyed, dismiss the action.. .or any part thereof, or render judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; 
(B)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable attorney's expenses, 
including attorney's fees, caused by the failure; 
(B)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order.. .as contempt of court: 
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(B)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference. 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other 
material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response 
to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use 
the witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to 
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In 
addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take any action 
authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
Part II. Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice 
Chapter 13. Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4: Fairness to Opposing Party 
and Counsel: 
A lawyer shall not: 
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence.. .or conceal a document 
or other material having potential evidentiary value. 
(b) falsify evidence,... 
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an 
open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 506: Physician and mental health therapist-patient 
(b) General Rule of Privilege. If the information is communicated in confidence 
and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a privilege, 
during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from 
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disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician 
or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of the 
patient*** 
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient, or 
the guardian or conservator of the patient. The person who was the physician or 
mental health therapist at the time of the communication is presumed to have 
authority during the life of the patient to claim the privilege on behalf of the 
patient. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 411: Liability Insurance. 
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible 
upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This 
rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when 
offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, Ownership, or control, or 
bias or prejudice of a witness. 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Part II. Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice 
Chapter 12. Code of Judicial Conduct 
Canon 3. A judge shall perform the duties of the office impartially and diligently 
(B) Adjudicative Responsibilities 
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice... A judge 
should be alert to avoid behavior that may be perceived as prejudicial. 
11 
(7).. .Except as authorized by law, a judge shall neither initiate nor consider, and 
shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or 
impending proceeding*** 
(E) Disqualification 
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances 
where: 
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's 
lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, or personal knowledge 
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; 
Statement of the Case 
A. Course Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court 
This case involves the claim of Plaintiff Robert Kearl for injuries he received 
while helping Defendant Ray Okelberry move a trailer on Mr. Okelberry's property. A 
jury found against Plaintiff on November 9, 2007, and the Court entered a judgment for 
no cause of action on December 3, 2007 (Case Docket, R. 801, attached as Ex. 2). 
Plaintiff moved for new trial due to the above mentioned errors and the Court ruled 
against the motion on December 10, 2007 (Case Docket, attached as Ex. 2). This timely 
appeal by the Plaintiff followed. 
B. Statement of the Facts 
This case arises out of a personal injury claim filed by appellant, Mr. Robert Kearl, 
against appellee, Mr. Ray Okelberry, for injuries Mr. Kearl sustained while Mr. Kearl 
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was assisting Mr. Okelberry in moving Mr. Okelberry's trailer out of Mr. Okelberry's 
garage on September 8, 2001 (Mem. in Supp. to PL's Mot. in Limine, 7 Sept. 2007, R. at 
278). 
Mr. Kearl was injured when the jack used to support, raise, and lower the tongue 
of a trailer during hitching and storage of the trailer suddenly released, dropping the 
trailer on Mr. Kearl's bent left knee which pushed his leg bone down into his ankle and 
foot and drove his ankle into the ground causing a "crush injury to his ankle and foot" 
(Mem. in Supp., R. at 279). At issue in the case was what caused the trailer jack to 
release; Mr. Okelberry claimed he saw Mr. Kearl pull the pin, but given the nature of Mr. 
Kearl's injuries, both expert witnesses testified that it was not possible for Mr. Kearl to 
pull the pin as described by Mr. Okelberry and injure his left knee because his left knee 
would have been away from the trailer rather than next to the trailer. Mr. Kearl thought 
that Mr. Okelberry released the jack, because he was by the jack and the trailer fell 
suddenly without warning, though he did not watch him do it. The jack would not fall 
without someone releasing it when it is brand new. 
Because of the injury Mr. Kearl suffered, he accrued substantial medical bills and 
lost wages. Also due to his injury, Mr. Kearl lost the ability tp participate in many 
outdoor activities that he enjoyed with his children, including riding motor bikes and 
playing sports like football and basketball. He also suffers intense pain in his knee and 
ankle that will progressively worsen with time. On 18 May 2005, Mr. Kearl brought suit 
against Mr. Okelberry to recover for his damages (Compl. and Jury Req., R. at 2). 
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Summary of Argument 
Throughout the proceedings of the trial, the Court perpetuated numerous 
reversible errors, the first being the harboring of biased jurors. At the conclusion of the 
trial, Kay Armstrong, the jury foreman, reported that jury member, W. Gary Harward, 
voted against Plaintiff simply because Plaintiff did not conduct his life in accordance to 
Harward's religious ideals (Armstrong Aff, R. at 813, attached as Ex. 3). Armstrong 
reports that Harward refused to consider the evidence presented during the trial, and 
Harward claimed that he had outside "help" in reaching his decision. Ms. Armstrong was 
shocked by Mr. Harward's level of prejudice. 
Furthermore, the Court refused to take special, post-trial actions to investigate Mr. 
Harward's bias. Instead, the Court ignored Ms. Armstrong's testimony and relied solely 
on Mr. Harward's obviously false voir dire statements, when he promised to fulfill his 
duties impartially and without bias (Two Orders Den. Mot. for New Trial, 12 Mar. 2008, 
R. at 930-35, attached as Ex. 4). 
Second, the Court allowed Defendant to enter evidence previously concealed from 
Plaintiff and the Court, and the Court failed to administer proper sanctions against 
Defense Counsel in remedy of Counsel's blatant misconduct. Despite the Court's pretrial 
order requiring disclosure before trial of all exhibits, in an attempt to surprise Plaintiff, 
Defense Counsel used evidence against Plaintiffs witness that was not disclosed at any 
time - including at trial - before it was used (Partial Tr. of Jury Trial, R. 948, pp. 21-24 
attached as Ex. 1). However, along with violating the very purpose of discovery to 
eliminate trickery and surprise during trial, Defense Counsel's use of this evidence was 
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itself illegal. Defense obtained and reviewed confidential medical records without 
permission. Counsel had not received permission from the owners of those records to 
view them herself or use them and show them to others and thus Counsel violated those 
patients5 rights to privacy set forth in U.C.A. §58-60-113 and in the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 506 (Partial Tr. of Jury Trial, R. 948, pp. 12-20, attached as Ex. 5). 
Furthermore, the extent of the Court's sanctions against Defense Counsel for their 
blatant disregard of professionalism and law was a mere private chastisement (Partial Tr. 
of Jury Trial, R. 948, pp. 28-29, attached as Ex. 6). The Court then removed the evidence 
after it was admitted over objection, and after it sat in front of the jury during trial, and 
ordered the jury to disregard it without an explanation or further sanctions (Partial Tr. of 
Jury Trial, R. 948, pp. 29-30, attached as Ex. 6). The Court refused Plaintiffs motion to 
reveal to the jury Defense Counsel's dishonesty, severely reducing the actual probability 
that the jury would successfully disregard the illegal evidence. The jury did not know 
that the evidence's introduction broke the law; the jury did nqt know why it was removed. 
Third, the Court further prejudiced Plaintiff by not allowing him to show Defense 
witness's potential bias as a witness hired by Defendant's insurance company. During 
the trial, Defendant Okelberry gave his testimony of what happened at the time of the 
injury. However, his testimony was incompatible with the actual facts of the occurrence 
(see Okelberry Deposition., R. at 208-220, attached as Ex. 7). Okelberry testified at trial 
that he watched Plaintiff from about four feet away kneeled by the jack and release the 
jack onto himself. However, Okelberry was obviously lying because if Plaintiff kneeled 
by the jack as described by Mr. Okelberry and released it, Plaihtiff s right knee would 
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have been closest to the trailer and his left knee (the knee hit by the trailer) away from the 
trailer. Progressive Insurance used an expert Dr. Craig Smith to divert attention away 
from Defendant's false testimony (see Smith Deposition., R. at 233-42, attached as Ex. 8). 
Dr. Craig Smith, Defendant's own expert, testified that Defendant's story was impossible 
and could not be true, and then gave an explanation of how he thought it happened. 
Defendant Okelberry then testified on cross examination that Dr. Smith's explanation of 
what happened was not true. Thus confusion arose because obviously Defendant himself 
did not approve of or hire Dr. Smith because Defendant Okelberry himself said Dr. 
Smith's story was false. Who then hired Dr. Smith? Since Colorado Casualty Insurance 
insured Defendant, clearly Colorado Casualty found it expedient to hire Dr. Smith itself 
in order to divert attention away from Defendant Okelberry's testimony which was 
obviously not true. Colorado Casualty did this to avoid liability costs. However, the 
Court refused to allow Plaintiff to explain who hired Dr. Smith. Instead, the Court 
instructed the jury that "defense counsel" hired Dr. Smith which was misleading and 
untrue as explained below. 
As presented below, it is the accepted practice of numerous jurisdictions to allow 
counsel to reveal an adverse witness's potential biases. However, in this case, the Court 
forbade Plaintiff from revealing that Colorado Casualty hired the witness (Minute Entry 
Denying Plaintiffs Motion in Limine, R. 554-555, attached as Exhibit 10 [No formal 
order was signed. Plaintiff requested that a transcription of the hearing on October 24, 
2007, be prepared and included in the record on appeal but was informed by the clerk that 
due to equipment malfunction, no recording was made of the hearing so the only record is 
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the minute entry R. 943]). Instead, the Court ordered that Plaintiff only say that Defense 
Counsel hired the witness (Court Instructs Jury that Defense Counsel hired Dr. Smith, R. 
948, p.36, attached as Exhibit 9) which was a misleading statement and untrue. This 
ruling prejudiced Plaintiff by denying him his right to folly examine the witness's 
credibility. Further, it promoted the misconception to the jury that Defense Counsel was 
so dedicated to Defendant's cause that Counsel used her own money to hire the witness. 
Argument 
I. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to ask specific voir 
dire questions and give specific jury instructions and when it ruled that 
Robert Kearl was not entitled to a new trial based on juror misstatements 
and omissions in response to voir dire questions. 
A, Relevant Law 
Under Rule 59(a)(1) the Court can order a new trial based on the "irregularity of 
the proceedings of the ...jury." Under Rule 59 (a)(2) juror misconduct may be proved by 
the affidavit of one of the jurors. A juror's misconduct may be challenged post-trial based 
on the jurors "misstatements or omissions" during voir dire (emphasis added). 
Misconduct of a juror provides a basis for a new trial. West v. ftolley, 103 P.3d 708, 710 
(Ut. 2004). Utah law has adopted a two-part test which is satisfied in this case. First, the 
Court must consider whether the juror fully and truthfully ansWered questions in voir dire. 
Second, if not, whether the juror would have been disqualified had he answered properly. 
Id. at 710. Voir dire responses evidencing bias give rise to a presumption that the juror is 
biased and the juror must be dismissed unless the presumption is rebutted. Id. at 711. 
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Each juror must consider the case on its merits and not what happened to the juror outside 
the courtroom or prior personal experiences. Id. at 713. 
Furthermore, once a juror manifests an inference of bias, it is insufficient for the 
juror merely to dispel said inference by claiming that he or she is capable of fulfilling his 
or her duties impartially. In such a situation the court must take special action to 
determine the juror's potential partiality. Id^ at 711. In State v. Woolev, 810 P.2d 440 
(Utah 1991), the Court ruled accordingly, saying: 
When an inference of bias is raised, the inference is generally not rebutted 
simply by a subsequent general statement by the juror that he or she can be 
fair and impartial. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[a] statement made by 
a juror that she intends to be fair and impartial loses much of its meaning in 
light of other testimony and facts which suggest a bias." Accordingly, u[t]he 
court, not the juror, must determine a juror's qualifications." 
Id. at 445 (citations omitted). 
In fact, there are many cases where the Court has deemed that insufficient voir 
dire concerning acknowledged or even possible juror bias necessitates action by the court 
to remedy the situation by ordering a new trial. For instance, in Depew v. Sullivan, 71 
P.3d 601 (Utah 2003) the Court found that a trial court abuses its discretion when its does 
not undertake special actions to determine a jury member's bias if bias has been 
suspected. They said: 
Due to the strong interest in enabling parties "to elicit necessary information 
for ferreting out bias," State v. Saunders. 992 P.2d 951, a trial court's dis-
cretion is most broad when it is exercised with respect to questions that have 
no apparent link to any potential bias. However, the trial judge's discretion 
narrows to the extent that questions do have some possible link to possible 
bias, and when proposed voir dire questions go directly to the existence of an 
actual bias, that discretion disappears. The trial court must allow such 
inquiries. 
18 
Depew, 71 P.3d at 606. The Court goes on to say that in such instances of 
suspected bias, general questions that do not probe sufficiently into a veniremen's 
potential bias are insufficient. 
As noted, the trial court, upon rejecting Plaintiffs proposed question, did 
ask the venire panel a substitute question in its place: "Would the fact that... 
the defendant ] is on a religious mission at the present time give you any 
problem in applying the facts in the law as you find it from the evidence in 
this case?" Defendant argues that this "broader question addressed the real 
issue-whether the jurors had any bias for or against... [the Church's] 
missionaries. When the jurors responded in the negative, no further 
questioning was necessary." 
Indeed, the court's question did "address the real issue." However, to say 
the question went far enough in eliciting the information Plaintiff was 
entitled to get "suggests an unwarranted naivety regarding human nature.... 
It is unrealistic to expect that any but the most sensitive and thoughtful 
jurors ... will have the personal insight, candor and openness to raise their 
hands in court and declare themselves biased." State v. Ball 685 P.2d 1055, 
1058 (Utah 1984). 
Depew71P.3dat610. 
Utah courts have taken great care to insure that its juries are impartial and that trial 
courts conduct a sufficient voir dire. Most recently in State v« King, No. 20060988, 
Supreme Court of Utah (filed August 5, 2008- unpublished), the Court said, "A defendant 
who is convicted of a crime by a jury comprised of even one member who has exhibited 
actual bias is entitled to a new trial. " King, No. 20060988 at 16-17 (citation omitted). 
For other similar cases where the Court has awarded a new trial for a trial court's 
insufficient or limited voir dire, see State v. Saunders, 992 P.^d 951 (Utah 1999), 
Johnson v. Armontrout 961 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1992), and State v. Ball 685 P.2d 1055 
(Utah 1984). 
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Finally, in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47, we read about the oath each 
juror must take before serving on the jury. Section (h) states that each juror must "render 
a true verdict according to the evidence and the instructions of the court." According to 
section (i), a juror promises to "not communicate with any person regarding a subject of 
the trial," and it is the "duty of jurors not to form or express an opinion regarding a 
subject of the trial except during deliberation." 
B. Facts of the Case 
Plaintiff requested that the Court ask specific voir dire questions regarding 
religious bias, and bias against someone who drinks alcohol. (Plaintiffs amended 
proposed jury questionnaire, questions 61 and 65, R. 566).l Defendant objected to 
proposed questionnaire no. 65 regarding alcohol arguing that "a juror's feelings about the 
use of alcohol are irrelevant [to] .. .impartiality" and such a question would lead to a 
"biased" and "unfair" jury. (Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Amended Proposed Jury 
Questionnaire, R. 734-735). The Court decided to ask more general voir dire questions. 
During voir dire, the Court gave the jurors a questionnaire which stated that its purpose 
was to "select a fair and impartial jury" and each juror was called upon to discuss with 
the judge any "valid reason that would make it difficult... to serve as a juror." In private 
discussion among Mr. Harward, the Court, and counsel, Mr. Harward promised that he 
Plaintiff anticipated that alcohol might be part of the case, because Dr. Clegg, Mr. 
Kearl's podiatrist, testified in his deposition that people often "self medicate" chronic 
pain with alcohol, as Mr. Kearl seemed to be doing. In this manner "self medication" 
became an issue at trial. 
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would listen to the evidence, make a decision based on the evidence, and that he would 
be "fair and impartial." (Partial Tr. of Jury Trial R. 948, pp. 3-4 attached as Ex. 12). 
However, Mr. Harward's statements to the Court and Counsel were untrue. He 
did not act impartially and he did not base his decision on the evidence and the law. Ms. 
Kay Armstrong, the foreman of the jury, testifies in her affidavit that she "saw prejudice 
on the part of more than one juror," especially from Mr. Harward (Armstrong Aff., R. at 
813, attached as Ex. 3). Mr. Harward came to the jury room with his mind made up (Id.). 
He felt that Plaintiff deserved the injury he received because Plaintiff conducted his life 
contrary to Mr. Harward's religious beliefs (Id. at 812) because Plaintiff drank alcohol 
and violated some of Mr. Harward's "other religious beliefs.'* Ms. Armstrong explains 
that Mr. Harward refused to examine the case based on the evidence and simply voted 
against Plaintiff because of his lifestyle (Id.). Ms. Armstrong also reports that Mr. 
Harward strove successfully to convince other jury members to oppose Plaintiff on the 
same grounds and that others shared Mr. Harward's bias (Id.). When questioned about 
his method of reaching his verdict in a phone call with Plaintiffs Counsel after the trial, 
Mr. Harward simply responded that he had "help" in making his decision (Aff. of Denton 
Hatch, R. at 805, attached as Ex. 13).2 
2
 Upon entering the jury room, Mr. Harward showed strong leadership when he 
asked all jurors to join in prayer. The jurors complied and gathered around and Mr. 
Harward offered the prayer for them. This was an attempt by Mr. Harward to round up 
the jurors and herd them into his religious approach to the case at the very beginning. 
Plaintiff presumes that the "help" Mr. Harward said he received was referring to help 
from God. Defendant cited cases in his post trial memorandum opposing the motion for a 
new trial, where inspiration received by a juror has in the past been found appropriate by 
Utah Courts. (Motion to Strike Affidavits, R. 832). However, inspiration from God that 
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Plaintiff also requested a jury instruction explaining that the use of alcohol 
cannot prejudice Plaintiff, but may be considered a pre-existing condition which could 
worsen or exacerbate Mr. Kearl's damages if Mr. Kearl's use of alcohol increases or 
becomes excessive when he "self medicates" his chronic pain caused by the injury. 
(Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions, p. 18, R. 584). Again Defendant objected to the 
instruction arguing that it was "up to the jury to decide... what qualifies as a pre-existing 
condition" and Plaintiffs proposed instruction that states that drinking alcohol may be a 
pre-existing condition was "self-serving and invades the province of the jury." 
(Defendant's Objections to Plaintiffs Instructions, R. 724). Again, the Court chose to 
give more general instructions and did not address the issue of alcohol directly. (R. 770-
784). During trial, Plaintiff entered an exception to the Court's decision regarding jury 
instructions, including the Court's failure to address alcohol directly as a pre-existing 
condition. (Partial Trial Transcript, R. 948, pp. 26-27). 
Despite receiving testimony from the jury foreman of Mr. Harward's professed 
prejudice, the Court did not question Mr. Harward regarding his prejudice or take any 
special action. Ultimately, as explained below, the Court denied Plaintiffs motion for a 
new trial (Case Docket 17, attached as Ex. 2). 
says "Don't consider the evidence," which seems to be what happened in this case, is not 
appropriate. If the "help" was from another source, such as a friend, family member, 
newspaper, or any outside source, it was also improper and contrary to the Court's 
instruction to consider the evidence only and obtain no outside help. The Trial Court 
refused to talk to Mr. Harward after the trial so the type or types of "help" Mr. Harward 
got were not clarified. 
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C. Duty to Marshal the Evidence 
The appellant has a duty to marshal the evidence in support of the Court's ruling. 
We now examine evidence marshaled in favor of the Court's decision. The Court said in 
its ruling that it gave the benefit of the doubt to the veracity of Ms. Armstrong's affidavit 
concerning the juror in question, Mr. Harward. If Ms. Armstrong's affidavit is true, 
argues the Court, then Mr. Harward folded his arms and refused to discuss the trial with 
any other jury member. Because of his non-communication with the other jurors, Mr. 
Harward could not have possibly had any persuasive affect on anyone else in the jury and 
the idea that he swayed other jurors to vote in accordance with his alleged bias is 
mistaken (Two Orders Den. Mot. for New Trial, R. at 931-32, attached as Ex. 4). 
Furthermore, the Court found that since six jurors after several hours of 
deliberation found against the Plaintiff, and Mr. Harward's alleged bias did not change 
the outcome of the jury's decision. Plaintiff had a fair trial. There were six jurors voting 
in favor of Defendant which is the number required by law (Order Den. Mot. for New 
Trial, R. at 931, attached as Ex. 4). 
D. Analysis 
The Court's reasoning for denying the Plaintiffs motion for a new trial is 
critically flawed due to their erroneous interpretation of Ms. Armstrong's affidavit. 
When Ms. Armstrong testified that Mr. Harward folded his arms to the rest of the jury, 
she did not mean that he refused to discuss his position with the other jurors, but she 
meant that he refused to listen to any of the arguments against his position from the other 
jurors (Armstrong Aff., R. at 812, attached as Ex. 3). He refused to change his beliefs 
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regardless of the evidence presented or the reasoning from the other jurors. It is apparent 
that Ms. Armstrong had this meaning in mind because we see later on in her affidavit that 
she clearly states that Mr. Harward openly sought to convince others of his bias (Id.). 
Mr. Harward5s leadership and active attempts to sway others to his position 
inherently voids the second portion of the Court's argument, since it is impossible to 
know how much effect Mr. Harward had on the opinion of the other jurors. Had Mr. 
Harward been removed during voir dire, had his biased influence been detected, the 
jurors could very well have voted differently. Further, if the Court assumes Ms. 
Armstrong's affidavit is true, then the affidavit is true when she said that she saw 
"prejudice on the part of more than one juror" (IdL at 813). It is also true that 
"assumptions" were not necessary. The Court should have set a hearing to inquire into 
Mr. Harward's prejudice and prejudice of other jurors. 
Further, Mr. Harward was one of the six votes needed for a verdict. Without his 
vote there would only have been five voting against Plaintiff which would not have been 
enough for a verdict against Plaintiff. Thus, assuming arguendo, that Mr. Harward did 
not sway another juror, his vote alone taints the verdict. 
Therefore, based on the above-cited statutes and the testimony from Ms. 
Armstrong, Plaintiff merits a new trial. As found in Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court can order a new trial based on irregularities in proceedings within 
the jury. However, the Court refused to grant Plaintiff this right. Due to Mr. Harward's 
prejudice, Plaintiff was denied his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. As explained 
in West and Wooley and the myriad of other cases cited above, the Court must take 
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special measures to insure impartiality of a juror when that juror has raised inferences of 
prejudice. Despite Ms. Armstrong's testimony, the Court took no special action to 
investigate Mr. Harward's bias. And as explained in King, even one impartial juror 
necessitates a new trial. Finally, Mr. Harward clearly violated the juror's oath in that he 
did not render a verdict based on evidence and that he acquired "help" from an extra-
judicial source in forming his decision (Aff. of Denton Hatch|, R. at 805, attached as Ex. 
13). 
II. The Trial Court erred in determining that sanctions should not be entered 
against Defense Counsel based on Counsel's misconduct and by determining 
that Plaintiff's Counsel could not argue to the jury What misconduct caused 
the evidence to be withdrawn. 
A. Relevant Law 
A separate basis for Plaintiffs motion for a new trial is found in Rule 59(a)(1), 
which condemns irregularity in the proceedings and conduct of an adverse party. A 
lawyer shall not "knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for 
an open refusal based on an assertion that no obligation exists." Further, an attorney shall 
not".. .unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence...., falsify evidence.. .(or) 
knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal" Utah R. of Prof 1 Conduct 
3.4(a)-(c). 
According to Glacier Land Co., L.L.C. v. Claudia Klawe & Associates, L.L.C., 154 
P.3d 852, 866 (Utah 2006), "one of the primary goals of the discovery process is 4to 
remove elements of surprise or trickery.'" If a party fails to disclose a document which it 
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intends to use at trial, that document shall not be permitted to be used, and in addition the 
Court may do any of the following: award costs and fees, "inform the jury of the failure to 
disclose," strike defenses, find facts in the action against the offending party, strike 
pleadings, or enter default against the offending party. Utah R. of Civ. P. 37(f). 
Utah Code Annotated 58-60-113 and Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 506, govern 
use of mental health care records at trial. A patient has the privilege to refuse to disclose 
or prevent the disclosure of any information regarding his or her mental health medical 
records, examinations, or treatments. Accordingly, Utah Courts have ruled that, "A 
patient has a right of privacy as regards to his or her own medical care." Lounsbury v. 
Capel 836 P.2d 188, 198 (Utah 1992). 
B. Facts of the Case 
Defense Counsel, Ruth Shapiro, deceived the Court and Plaintiffs Counsel by 
presenting to the jury evidence without prior disclosure, and, even worse, by literally 
hiding the evidence she would present until it was disclosed to the jury. When Defendant 
presented the item of evidence to Plaintiffs Counsel and to the Court just before 
questioning a witness at trial, Defendant's Counsel hid part of the exhibit. Plaintiffs 
counsel objected to the entire exhibit on the grounds that he had never seen it before. At 
the time of the objection, Plaintiffs Counsel did not know that some of the exhibit was 
still hidden. The Court ruled that the exhibit could be admitted even though there was no 
prior disclosure. (Partial trial transcript R at 948, p.5, attached as Exhibit 11). The exhibit 
was then presented to the jury at which time Defendant's Counsel took off the covering 
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and showed the exhibit including the hidden portion to the jury before it was shown to 
either the Court or opposing Counsel. 
It all happened so fast that the Judge did not address the hidden part of the exhibit 
until the next day. When it came to light through Plaintiffs objection that some of the 
exhibit was hidden from the Court and opposing counsel, the Judge himself said he was 
"stunned" and "taken back" when he saw how the exhibit was used. He said the conduct 
of Ms. Shapiro was "deceptive in nature," "inappropriate," and "wrong" because part of 
the exhibit was "hidden" from the Court and from Plaintiffs Counsel. The Court also 
said there was "no way for Mr. Hatch to know what was on it. I (the Court) had no way 
to know what was going to happen until it happened *** because the full exhibit was 
hidden from me (the Court), [and] the full exhibit was hidden from Mr. Hatch." (Partial 
trial transcript R. at 948, pp. 16-19, attached as Exhibit 5). 
Ms. Shapiro used the exhibit to cross examine Dr. Ronald France, one of 
Plaintiffs damage experts. Since Dr. France had not seen the exhibit before, he was 
caught off guard and surprised and struggled to respond to questions from Ms. Shapiro 
about the exhibit. He did not look prepared because he wasn't prepared, and he looked 
incompetent because the exhibits contained a summary of many medical records which 
he was asked to respond to without any preparation. He was asked to address literally 
hundreds of pages of records and to compare his recommendations for several patients 
which he could not do instantly without notice or preparation, and then to say whether Ms. 
Shapiro's summary was accurate, all of which he could have addressed properly with 
preparation. He could only answer that Ms. Shapiro's summary "seems to be accurate" 
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and "they look accurate as far as I can tell." He was allowed to see the jury exhibit for 
only a few moments when he was asked to walk down and look and then was asked to 
state that it was accurate. Plaintiffs Counsel also objected to the medical records which 
Defense Counsel passed out at the same time on the grounds that the records weren't 
provided prior to trial (Defense Counsel, Ruth Shapiro, passed out to Plaintiff and the 
Court for the first time 100-200 pages of unredacted medical records of patients unrelated 
to Plaintiff at the same time she presented her surprise summary exhibit to the jury all of 
which were marked "confidential" and use only with "permission" on the first page) and 
the Court overruled the objection. (Partial Trial Transcript R. 948 p. 7, attached as 
Exhibit 11). Dr. France had seen the reports in the past when he prepared them but had 
not reviewed them in preparation for trial because they were related to other patients and 
he did not know they were going to be used. In addition, each report was an estimated 
40-50 pages in length, and no one including Dr. France could meaningfully compare 
them or analyze them without notice and preparation. 
The records were treatment plans prepared by Dr. Ronald France which Defense 
Counsel somehow obtained from other files in her office. Each set of records stated in 
italics on the front page "This report contains confidential information that is protected 
by law (Utah Code Ann. 58-60-l-l-(l)) and must not be shared with any person without 
the written consent of the patient or a person legally appointed as power of attorney for 
the patient." See also Utah Code Annotated 58-60-113 and Rule of Evidence 506. Each 
3Ruth Shapiro obtained the confidential documents from another case she handled 
(see Letter, July 29, 2008). 
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report contained personal and medical history, numerous psychological tests with 
answers, and detailed questionnaires about every aspect of the patient's personal life with 
answers. In other words, highly sensitive and personal information which no patient 
wants revealed to unknown persons. In addition to reading the reports herself, when she 
passed out unredacted copies of the reports at trial to Plaintiffs Counsel and the Court 
she perpetuated and broadened the unauthorized use of them. In doing so, Defendant's 
Counsel intentionally violated Rule 506 and Section 58-60-113 and caused others to 
violate the law. 
Defense Counsel did not disclose the exhibit and documents ahead of time as 
ordered by the Court in its pretrial order (Parties ordered to exchange exhibits by October 
6,2007. R. 158). If Defendant had disclosed the exhibit as ordered, Plaintiffs expert 
would have been prepared to answer questions about it and cqnfidentiality would have 
been preserved.4 But this is the reason why she did not disclose it. Defense Counsel 
thought the element of surprise, and the powerful effect the evidence would have on the 
jury, was worth violating the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. This decision by Defense 
Counsel was so brazen and so out-of-bounds that it cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, 
Defense Counsel appeared to the jury to have a Perry Mason-like command of the court 
room. The jury was surely impressed. Meanwhile, Dr. France and Plaintiffs Counsel 
Ms. Shapiro obviously anticipated using the information in advance of trial. 
Before presenting the exhibit at trial, she gathered the records from other files, sifted 
through them, summarized them on a chart, copied all of the reports to hand out at trial, 
and then put a blow up of the chart on foam board. 
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appeared to be the opposite, groping and stumbling as they tried to understand what was 
happening. 
Defense Counsel, Ruth Shapiro, argued that she only put initials on the exhibit and 
did not use full names. This is immaterial. As stated above, she was not entitled to have 
those records herself and she could not lawfully pass them out to others at trial in the way 
she did.5 Defense Counsel's partial, but ineffective, attempt to protect confidentiality by 
using the initials of patients on the summary board shows she knew they were 
confidential, but she failed to protect confidentiality. Ms. Shapiro did all this knowingly. 
Karen Green, who is also a client of Plaintiff s Counsel, Denton Hatch, was one of 
the persons whose treatment plan was misused. Karen Green did not give permission for 
disclosure of her confidential information (see Aff. of Karen Green, R. at 808) and was 
offended that it was read and used by Ms. Shaprio without her permission. This violation 
was for personal gain: Ruth Shapiro's personal gain, and her client's personal gain, if she 
won the trial. 
When the judge learned of Ms. Shapiro's trickery, he told her it was deceptive 
(outside of the presence of the jury) and withdrew the exhibit. Plaintiff argued that he 
should be allowed to explain to the jury why the exhibit was removed and point out 
5The night after the exhibit was entered into evidence, Plaintiffs Counsel 
contacted Karen Green to confirm that she did not give permission for her medical 
records to be used in another case. Karen Green was angry and upset and requested that 
a motion be made which Plaintiffs Counsel made the following day. If Ruth Shapiro 
had not handed out unredacted copies of the records, Plaintiffs Counsel would not have 
known who to contact. 
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Defendant's dishonesty. However, the Court prohibited any explanation to the jury as to 
why the exhibit was removed and merely instructed the jury to ignore the evidence. 
C. Duty to Marshal the Evidence 
To understand the Court's reason for reaching its decision to deny Plaintiffs 
Motion for New Trial based on counsel misconduct, we examine evidence marshaled in 
favor of the Court's decision. First, the exhibit in question was based solely on damages 
and not on liability. Dr. France's testimony sought to establish the depth of Plaintiff s 
injury and Defense Counsel used the exhibit to challenge Dr. France's evaluation of 
Plaintiffs damages. Neither Dr. France's testimony, nor Defense's exhibit focused on 
the liability of the Defendant. Therefore, because the jury was instructed to determine 
Defendant's liability first and to evaluate the extent of Plaintiff s damages only if they 
found Defendant liable, the exhibit was ultimately irrelevant since the jury found 
Defendant not liable. The exhibit did not seek to prove Defendant's liability, so whether 
or not the jury considered the exhibit even after being told to disregard it is completely 
moot (Order Denying Motion for New Trial, 12 Mar. 2008, R, at 931, attached as Ex. 4). 
Second, the jury did not know the names of the patients which were the subject of the 
reports so confidentiality was not breached with the jury. Third, Defendant argued that 
the evidence was for rebuttal and did not need to be disclosed in advance, and the records 
were also reports prepared by Dr. France so he did not need preparation and it was 
appropriate to ask Dr. France about them. (Partial Trial Transcript, R. 958 p. 5). Last, 
Defense Counsel, after showing the unhidden part of the exhibit to the Court and 
Plaintiffs Counsel and after the exhibit was received by the Court, and as she was 
31 
walking up to the podium to present the exhibit to the jury, turned to the Court and gave 
the Court a warning that she was about to disclose a hidden part of the exhibit. She said, 
"In all fairness, your Honor, there is more information underneath that I am going to get 
into." (Partial Trial Transcript, R. 948 p. 5). 
D. Analysis 
The Court's argument in defense of its decision is insufficient for several major 
reasons. First, the Court's argument fails to consider the effect of surprise. More 
important than the content of the exhibit is the way an ambush makes the witness appear. 
Dr. France's testimony was not only meant to show that Plaintiff was injured, but that he 
was greatly injured. This has the purpose of establishing in the jurors' minds the gravity 
of the case in which they are a part. When Dr. France appears to hesitate, or be 
unprepared, or incompetent, or unbelievable because of an ambush, his credibility is 
damaged and Plaintiffs entire case is damaged even though Dr. France is a damage 
witness, because in the jury's eyes Dr. France is part of the Defendant's case and his 
failure can taint Plaintiffs case. The message which the jury receives is not just in words 
but in the facial reactions and body language of the witness. Therefore, the effect of the 
surprise cannot be understood from reviewing the written word of the trial record alone. 
Dr. France was asked to compare other reports he prepared with the one he did in 
this case. This is probably appropriate if done by the rules, but if the witnesses are 
questioned about hundreds of pages, even though they are his records, without 
preparation he will fumble for answers to questions. Dr. France would have testified 
differently if he had been given notice of the exhibit. The exhibit used to impeach Dr. 
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France could make the jury think that the doctor was blowing Plaintiffs injuries 
completely out of proportion and that the Plaintiff brought a frivolous civil suit against 
Defendant. If Defense Counsel was successful in impeachment of Dr. France, the jury 
would think of the Defendant as another victim of a frivolous lawsuit. Thus, because of 
the exhibit and the way it was used, the jury became more inclined to favor the Defendant 
as the victim. 
The Court concluded that since the exhibit did not deal with Defendant's liability, 
it was irrelevant to the jury's verdict. However, clearly such is not the case. Plaintiff 
argues that even though the jury was ordered to forget the exhibit, it is impossible to fully 
evaluate the extent of the exhibit's influence on the jury's decision-making. Once the 
jury had seen this information and heard the testimony connected with it, it was not 
possible to remove it from the jury's mind, even though the Court instructed the jury to 
ignore it. The jury did not know why the exhibit was withdrawn, nor did they know why 
they should ignore it. (Partial Trial Transcript, R. 948 p. 21-24, 28, attached as Exhibit J). 
If the Court had told the jury about Defendant's dishonesty it would have removed 
prejudice against Plaintiff, prevented Defendant's Counsel to act dishonestly with 
impunity, and placed blame where it should be. 
In addition, the Court's decision completely skirted a major reason for Plaintiffs 
Motion for New Trial: Defense Counsel broke the law. As mentioned previously, the 
exhibit used by Defense Counsel utilized private medical information without the 
permission of its owners. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59, says that a new trial is 
to be granted for irregularity in the trial proceedings by the Court or by an adverse party. 
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Plaintiff argues that Defense Counsel's illegal actions certainly qualify as an irregularity 
in trial proceeding. The Court failed to address this violation in justifying its decision. 
Therefore, because of Defense Counsel's blatant trickery and trying to "surprise" 
the Court and Counsel by using undisclosed evidence; because of Defense Counsel's 
illegal use of medical records without permission of their owners; and, because of the 
Court's passive/non-existent sanction against Defense Counsel and failure to sufficiently 
instruct the jury on the dishonest use of the exhibit, Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial. It is 
injustice for such a blatant violation of the law and Rule of Procedure to result in any 
benefits or reward for the Defendant. Clearly in this situation the Court must error on the 
side of protecting Plaintiff and the Justice System from such blatant dishonesty which is 
inconsistent with the spirit of the concept of justice. 
Defendant also argued that the exhibit was a "rebuttal exhibit" and did not need to 
be disclosed. This was not so much a rebuttal exhibit as a cross examination exhibit 
which Defendant prepared well in advance of trial. It took some time to gather the 
confidential records, summarize them, copy all of them for use at trial, and put the 
summary on a foam board for the jury. There is no reason why this exhibit could not 
have been disclosed, and Defense Counsel has never attempted to give a reason why it 
was not disclosed other than she didn't think she was required to disclose it. But in 
summary, there are multiple reasons why the exhibit should have been disclosed 
including the Court's pretrial order requiring exhibits to be disclosed to the opposing 
party, violation of the law and the Rules of Procedure, avoiding ambush and surprise to 
the witness, and protection of confidential medical records. 
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Last, just before Defense Counsel revealed the hidden part of the exhibit to the 
jury she gave the Court a warning, almost under her breath, that she was about to do so. 
This does not suffice as a proper disclosure even though it was given before, albeit 
seconds, it was used as an exhibit. The Court at that point had already received the 
exhibit and probably had no idea what she meant when she said she had something 
"underneath." It does show that she knew what she was doing. She acted intentionally. 
The foam board exhibit had a blank sheet of paper taped to it when it was shown to the 
Court and to counsel so that the paper could not be lifted. It appeared that the paper had 
nothing under it because it was taped securely down and so it appeared that it would be 
used for writing or nothing at all. There was other writing which was visible on the 
exhibit to which Plaintiff objected. Defense Counsel's last second "disclosure" was also 
"deceptive in nature" shows that she knew she had hidden something when she presented 
the exhibit to Court and Counsel and she knew she should reveal it. No rational judge 
would normally expect a trained attorney to announce she was going to give something to 
the jury that she hid from the Court. Such behavior is such a departure from the Rules 
that the Court would probably not understand the statement. In this case the Court 
probably did not know what she was talking about and did not address it until the 
following day when the issue was raised by Plaintiff. In the end, Defense Counsel's last-
second-one-sentence "in all fairness" disclosure was really a disclosure that she 
intentionally hid the information from the Court and Counsel. 
III. The Trial Court erred by allowing Dr. Craig Smith to testify without allowing 
Plaintiff to tell the jury that Colorado Casualty Insurance hired Dr. Smith. 
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A. Relevant Law... 
1. ...Concerning the Admissibility of Dr. Smith's Testimony. 
In Utah, a witness who is "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill experience, 
training, or education" may testify as to specialized knowledge if such testimony will 
"assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Utah R. 
of Evid. 702. Under this rule, the district court is given discretion to "determine the 
admissibility of expert testimony, and to determine if the witness is qualified to give an 
opinion on a particular matter." Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (citation omitted). All admissible expert testimony has to be reliable, relevant, and 
helpful to the trier of fact. "Evidence not to be reliable cannot as a matter of law, assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine the fact in issue and, therefore 
is inadmissible." State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 338, 397-398 (Utah 1989) (citation 
omitted). 
Where a product is tested there must be sufficient evidence that it was in 
substantially the same condition—in all relevant respects—when tested as it was at the 
time of the injury. See Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 
479 (1st Cir. 1997) (evidence of testing auto after 18 months excluded) citing Kukuruza v. 
General Elec. Co., 510 F.2d 1208,1211-1212 (1st Cir. 1975) (requiring a showing of the 
product's condition at the time of the injury and the time of the inspection); Williams v. 
Briggs Co., 62 F.3d 703, 707-708 (5th Cir. 1995) (excluding testimony about heater 
malfunction where the test was conducted two years after the injury and unspecified 
repairs were made); and Romano v. Ann and Hope Factory Outlet Inc., 417 A.2d 1375, 
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1379-1380 (RI 1980) (exclusion of design defect testimony where the expert examined 
the bicycle two years after the accident and after other experiments were performed). 
2. .. .Concerning the Admissibility of Evidence Showing that Dr. 
Smith was Hired by Colorado Casualty Insurance. 
Utah courts, as well as courts in other states, typically prohibit counsel from 
mentioning whether or not a person is covered by insurance. This is verbalized in Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 411. It says: 
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not 
admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise 
wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of 
insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof 
of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness. 
It is important to distinguish the second sentence of the rule from the first. It does not 
forbid evidence of insurance when that evidence is offered to show an insurance 
company's potential control of a witness. If an insurance company hires a witness to 
testify in court on its behalf, obviously it would be expedient for the jury to know this in 
order to determine that witness's credibility. 
As explained in the Utah rule, there have been several cases in several other states 
where courts ruled in favor of allowing counsel to disclose evidence of an adverse 
witness's employment with an insurance company. For instance, in Herbold v. Ford 
Motor Co., 221 S.W.2d 646 (Ky. 1949) the court said: 
Notwithstanding the rigid rule of excluding evidence which tends to reveal 
that an insurance company would have to pay any judgment obtained 
against the defendant, we have ruled that, where such insurance carrier 
injects itself into the case and its agent or representative testified adversely 
to the interest of the plaintiff, it is competent for him to show whom the 
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witness was representing since this would tend to show bias or special 
interest of the witness. 
Id. at 649 (citation omitted). 
In Clayton v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 276 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1955), the 
court reached a similar ruling. In this case, the defense attempted to convey the 
perception to the jury that their expert witness was hired by the defendant, when 
the witness was actually hired by the liable insurance company. The court argued 
that in such an instance, it is necessary for the plaintiff to distinguish the witness 
as an employee of the insurance company in order to show possible bias: 
We find no error in the action of the trial court in this connection. It is 
always competent, insofar as it bears upon a witness1 credibility, to show 
the connection between a witness and a party to the cause... Furthermore, 
the element of credibility is implicit in this situation. Having in mind the 
reference which counsel for defendant made to the witness Wieland both in 
the cross-examination of plaintiff and in the direct examination of Mr. 
Wieland it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the jury was given 
the mistaken impression that Mr. Wieland was an employee of defendant... 
plaintiffs counsel had the right to correct the impression by showing that he 
was never employed by the Public Service Company but was an employee 
of Transit Casualty Company even though it was thereby revealed that 
there was an insurance carrier in the background. 
Id. at 624. For other similar rulings where courts found that it is legitimate and 
prudent for counsel to show a witness's possible bias through his employment 
with an insurance company, see Sullivan v. Rixey, 403 S.E.2d 346 (Va. 1991) and 
Henning v. Thomas, 366 S.E.2d 109 (Va. 1988). 
B. Facts of the Case 
This case law is important in considering the strategy employed by Defense 
Counsel in the current case. Defendant Ray Okelberry's testimony was riddled with 
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contradictions. Defendant Okelberry said he did not cause the trailer to fall on Plaintiff 
Robert Kearl. Mr. Okelberry claimed he saw Mr. Kearl lift the release handle and drop 
the jack on himself. Mr. Okelberry said he was four feet away and Robert Kearl was in 
clear vision. However, Mr. Okelberry's story was shown to be untrue because Mr. 
Kearl's left leg could not have been crushed if he was kneelirig where Mr. Okelberry said 
he was. In that position Mr. Kearl's right knee, not his left knee, would have been next to 
the trailer. However, Mr. Okelberry could not change his recorded story after he realized 
that his account of what happened was clearly impossible. 
Colorado Casualty Insurance held a large residential liability policy covering Mr. 
Okelberry, and it hired Christensen, Jensen and Ruth Shapiro who are on its Defense 
Counsel panel to defend Mr. Okelberry. After Defendant Ray Okelberry testified 
contrary to known facts, Colorado Casualty made the decision to hire Dr. Craig Smith to 
testify that Mr. Okelberry's story was incorrect and to give an alternative theory of what 
happened. This was Colorado Casualty's attempt to rehabilitate Mr. Okelberry whose 
story was not believable. Thus, we have Defendant's own expert saying Defendant's 
story is not true, and Defendant saying his expert's opinion is not true, and no 
explanation of this conflict except the Court's instruction to the jury that Defense 
Counsel hired Dr. Smith (Partial Trial Transcript, R. 948, p. 3^ 5, attached as Exhibit 9). 
There were two principal conclusions of Dr. Smith's testimony. First, he 
concluded that the jack could have fallen on its own (see Op. of Craig Smith, R.125, p.3). 
Dr. Smith tested the possibility of this theory by using the san^e jack from the accident 
(although six years older) and by partially engaging the suppori pins for the jack. Within 
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five to ten minutes, when Dr. Smith began "turning the jack handle," the jack fell (Id. at 
R. 125, p.2). 
The second principal conclusion of Dr. Smith's testimony dealt with the 
uncertainty of Mr. Kearl's position at the time of the accident. He claims that Mr. 
Kearl's injuries (i.e. the dislocation and fracturing of the bones in Mr. Kearl's left leg) 
indicate that Mr. Kearl's leg was not in a vertical position when the trailer fell, contrary 
to Mr. Kearl's testimony. And, because of this, there is insufficient evidence to 
determine Mr. Kearl's exact position (Id. at 1-2). 
Yet, with Dr. Smith's conclusions came two obvious deficiencies. First, 
concerning his experiment to test the possibility that the jack could have fallen on its own, 
Dr. Smith used the very same jack from the accident. At the time of the accident, the 
jack was brand new, without defects (R. 285, Okelberry Dep. 31-33). When Dr. Smith 
tested the jack six years later, there were numerous defects that prevented its proper 
functioning, thus making it more possible that the jack would fall on its own (see Op. of 
David Ingebretsen R. 302-305 and 311-314, 1-2, for an exhaustive account of how the 
various safety features preventing the jack from falling on its own were bent and largely 
incapable of serving their purpose when Dr. Smith tested the jack). 
The second major deficiency comes by the very fact that Dr. Smith has no medical 
experience. He is extremely well trained and accomplished in engineering, yet his 
training in anatomical structures is limited to a single class that he took in college 
concerning biomechanics. In fact, to draw his conclusion concerning the impact of the 
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injuries to Mr. Kearl's leg, Dr. Smith turned to a graph of the skeletal structure that he 
found on the internet. (Dep. of Craig Smith 14-21, R. 233-242). 
Therefore, in light of these discrepancies, Plaintiff moVed to disqualify Dr. 
Smith's testimony. Yet, the Court allowed Dr. Smith to testify. (Minute entry regarding 
Ruling on Motion in Limine, R. 554-555, Exhibit 10 attache^). Plaintiff then sought to 
introduce evidence to the Court that demonstrated possible control in order to impeach Dr. 
Smith's testimony. 
However, the Court forbade Plaintiff from showing the witness's employer 
connection, thus denying Plaintiff his right to examine the witness's potential biases. The 
Court denied Plaintiffs pre-trial motion and would not allow Plaintiff to tell the jurors 
that the reason Dr. Craig Smith was called to say Mr. Okelberry's story was not true was 
because Colorado Casualty made the decision to try to cover up Mr. Okelberry's untrue 
story. Dr. Smith did testify at trial that Mr. Okelberry's story was not true, and Mr. 
Okelberry testified that Dr. Smith's story was untrue. Plaintiff was ordered by the Court 
to tell the jury that the reason for the discrepancy was that Defense "Counsel hired Dr. 
Smith." (Partial Trial Exhibit, R. 948, p. 36, attached as Exhibit 9). Thus, the jury was 
misled to think such things as the following: 1) that Defense Counsel was so passionate 
about her client and thought his cause was so just that with her own money she was 
willing to help her client by hiring an expert to straighten his story out; 2) that Mr. 
Okelberry had little or no money; and 3) that they should feel sorry for Mr. Okelberry. 
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C. Duty to Marshal the Evidence 
To understand why the Court decided against Plaintiffs Motion in Limine, we 
must turn to the memorandums produced by Defendant. Unfortunately, due to technical 
error, the Court was unable to produce a transcript of the pre-trial hearing concerning the 
Court's decision regarding Plaintiffs Motion in Limine. For some reason the hearing 
was not recorded and so could not be transcribed and included as part of the trial record. 
Thus, we examine the arguments against the motion as given by the Defendant as found 
in "Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine" (R. at 339) and as found 
in "Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine RE: Colorado Casualty 
Insurance" (hereinafter "Mem. Opp'n in Limine," R. at 430). 
1. Dr. Smith's testimony should be allowed. 
In defending the admissibility of Dr. Smith's testimony, Defendant argued two 
main points. First, they argued that the age of the jack was irrelevant in Dr. Smith's 
experiment. Since he tested the possibility of the jack to fall on its own, and since he 
tested its general reliability, Dr. Smith's experimentation evaluated the design of the jack. 
The actual condition of the jack at the time of Dr. Smith's experiment was largely 
irrelevant since he inquired into its design. 
Second, according to Rules 702 and 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence an expert 
is qualified by his or her "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," and 
someone who qualifies according to these criteria may testify "in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise." Utah R. Evid. 702. Under Rule 703, this testimony may be based on 
"facts or data... perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing." 
42 
Thus, according to these rules, Dr. Smith's testimony is clearly admissible since he 
earned his doctorate from MIT, he taught at BYU since 1968? and he published numerous 
papers. Dr. Smith is certainly considered an expert. 
Finally, Defendant argues that if Dr. Smith is not allowed to testify, then Mr. 
Ingebretsen (the expert witness for Plaintiff) should not be allowed to testify also. This is 
because Mr. Ingebretsen conducted his examinations using the same jack used by Dr. 
Smith. Further, Mr. Ingebretsen's experimentation was favorable to Plaintiffs claim. 
2. Plaintiff must not be allowed to reveal evidence concerning Dr. 
Smith's employers. 
Defendant argues that evidence concerning Dr. Smith's employment by Colorado 
Casualty is inadmissible according to the Utah Rules of Evidetice 401,402, and 403. 
Evidence regarding who retained an expert witness is irrelevant in a case dealing with 
negligence and is thus inadmissible according to Rules 401 and 402. It does not help the 
jury understand how the accident was caused, nor does it apply to the amount of damages 
incurred by Plaintiff (Mem. Opp'n in Limine 4, R. at 427). Evidence of the fact that 
Defendant was insured brings unfair prejudice against Defendant, which is prohibited by 
Utah Rules of Evidence, 403 (Mem. Opp'n in Limine 4-5, R. at 426-27). 
Second, evidence of a defendant's liability insurance is inadmissible under the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, 411. Such evidence would create risk for defendant because 
upon learning of defendant's insured status the jury "would likely be compelled to assign 
more culpability to the defendants, regardless of what the evidence [reasonably] shows, 
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because defendant appears to be in a better financial position to pay any damages." (Mem. 
Opp'n in Limine 5, R. at 426). 
D. Analysis 
1. Defendant failed to show the admissibility of Dr. Smith's 
testimony. 
Defendant's argument concerning Dr. Smith's experiment and the condition of the 
jack during the experiment is vague and fails to completely address the discrepancies 
raised by Plaintiff. In fact, it misses completely the point Plaintiff raised in his Motion in 
Limine. Dr. Smith tested the possibility of the jack to fall on its own. However, Mr. 
Ingebretsen's entire evaluation of the jack showed that had the jack been working 
properly as designed, it would be impossible for the jack to fall on its own. Mr. 
Ingebretsen shows that it was designed with numerous safety features made to prevent 
such falls. Even with human error, these safety features would keep the jack from falling 
unless the release was engaged by the user. 
However, these safety features had long since ceased to function by the time that 
Dr. Smith conducted his experiment. Mr. Ingebretsen shows that in its new state, said 
features would work as designed. But, over the six years from the time of the accident 
(when the jack was brand new) to the time of Dr. Smith's experiment, the guide tubes had 
become bent, the locking pins had lost their spring, and the foot of the jack rusted to the 
point of no movement. These features were designed to prevent the pins from becoming 
partially engaged. 
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Therefore, it is because of the condition of the jack, and not the design of the jack 
itself, that Dr. Smith was able to come to his conclusion. Thp condition of the jack had 
so changed from the day of the accident (when it was new) to the time of the experiment 
that it essentially became a different jack, one that was unable to perform the function for 
which it was designed. And as the Court ruled in Rimmasch, Bogosian, Kukuruza, 
Williams, and Romano, unless the product is shown to be in the same condition as the 
time of accident or injury, results from tests conducted on that product are inadmissible. 
Second, on the admissibility of Dr. Smith's testimony concerning injuries 
sustained by Plaintiff to his left leg, Defendant made no attempt to refute Plaintiffs 
argument that Dr. Smith was not qualified to give testimony on such matters. Defendant 
attempted to divert the issue by showing all of Dr. Smith's accomplishments in the field 
mechanical engineering, but Defendant failed to establish his expertise in medically 
related areas, such as biomechanics or anatomy. Rules 702 and 703 explain that a 
formally trained person may give testimony and opinion on things pertaining to his or 
her area of expertise, but that does not give license to that person, once established as an 
expert in one area, to give testimony on things outside of his expertise. Utah R. Evid. 
702-03. Dr. Smith could not be considered an expert in biomechanics so his testimony 
concerning Plaintiffs injuries should have been excluded. 
Finally, Defendant again attempted to divert the issue of the admissibility of Dr. 
Smith's testimony by attacking Mr. Ingebretsen's testimony, these attacks, as outlined 
above, do nothing to show how Dr. Smith's testimony survives the deficiencies addressed 
by Plaintiff. They were merely a feeble attempt by Defendant to draw the Court's 
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attention away from the inadequacies of Dr. Smith's testimony to some imagined 
shortcomings of Mr. Ingebretsen's testimony. Thus, since they do not even address the 
arguments presented by Plaintiff in support of rejecting Dr. Smith's testimony, they are 
irrelevant to this issue. 
2. The Court erred in not allowing evidence showing potential 
control and bias. 
In short, the opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine to allow evidence showing 
that Dr. Smith was hired by Colorado Casualty Insurance fails for several reasons. First, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, 402 says that relevant evidence must have "any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to be the determination of the action 
more probably or less probably than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 
402. The "consequence" arises from Dr. Smith's testimony. He testified, essentially, 
against Plaintiffs claim of negligence. Evidence showing Dr. Smith's potential bias 
through his employment allows the jury to determine if his testimony is credible and, 
therefore, if Plaintiff s claim of negligence is frivolous or not. Thus, this evidence is 
extremely relevant to the determination of the action. 
Second, concerning Defendant's objection to the motion on the grounds of its 
potential of creating an unfair bias against Defendant, we look again at Rule 411 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not 
admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise 
wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of 
insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as 
proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness. 
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Utah R. Evid. 411 (emphasis added). As has been argued previously, the evidence 
of Dr. Smith's employment is necessary to show control and possible bias. These 
are aspects of a witness that a jury needs to know, and are allowed under Rule 411. 
That the Court rejected Plaintiffs Motion in Limine on these grounds clearly 
opposes an established rule of evidence found not only in Utah, but in states across 
the nation. Therefore, the Court erred grievously and further prejudiced Plaintiffs 
chances at a fair trial by rejecting the evidence in question. 
IV. The Court erred by failing to enter its disqualification after holding an 
ex parte meeting with Defense Counsel. 
A. Relevant Law 
The Utah Code of Judicial Administration governs judicial conduct and provides 
guidance to judges. Cannon 1 states that a judge should "personally observe high 
standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be 
preserved." Cannon 2 states that a judge should avoid the "appearance of impropriety in 
all activities." Further, we read that a judge "...shall perform judicial duties without bias 
or prejudice" and shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by "words or conduct 
manifest bias...." Utah Code of Jud. Admin., Canon 3(B)(5). Additionally, "A judge 
should be alert to avoid behavior that may be perceived to be prejudicial." Utah Code of 
Jud. Admin., Canon 2(B)(5). Except as authorized by law, a judge "...shall neither initiate 
nor consider, and shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning a 
pending or impending proceeding." Utah Code of Jud. Admin., Canon 3(B)(7). Finally, 
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a judge shall enter a disqualification "in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality 
may reasonably be questioned...'9 including where the judge has a "personal bias or 
prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, a strong personal bias concerning an 
issue in the case...." Utah Code of Jud. Admin., Canon 3(E) (1) [emphasis added]. 
In In re Young, 984 P.2d 997 (Utah 1999), the Court considered judicial ethics as 
required in the Utah Code. The case examined a judge who, before the issuance of 
attorney fees, communicated his opinion of a fee issue to one of the trial's counsel. The 
Court found that this ex parte communication, even though the trial proper had ended, 
was in violation of judicial standards. Concerning the negative effects of this violation, 
the Court said: 
Regardless of whether Judge Young was actually presiding over the case at 
the time of the call, he had presided over all of the prior proceedings and 
should not have commented on his view of the fee issue to Hintze. 
Although Judge Young may not have intended to afford any one-sided 
benefit in doing so, his ex parte comments provided Hintze and the school 
district with information that at the very least had the potential of giving 
them an advantage in settlement negotiations.... Judge Young should have 
realized the impropriety of engaging in a private conversation about a 
pending issue with only one of the attorneys involved in the case. 
Young, 984 P.2d at 1006. The Court goes on to say: 
Regardless of whether they were able to capitalize on that information in 
settlement negotiations, Judge Young jeopardized the integrity of the court 
system by creating the risk for that to happen. In so doing, Judge Young 
violated a fundamental tenet of our judicial system: that those who seek to 
resolve their disputes in court receive fair treatment. 
Id. at 1008. 
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B. Facts of the Case 
In Kearl v. Okelberry, during jury deliberations, the Court met with Defense 
Counsel and Defendant ex parte to compliment Defense Counsel on her work in the case, 
to state that he thought she had a strong finish, and to wish h^r good luck. Plaintiff and 
Plaintiffs Counsel and the rest of the audience were out of the courtroom except for one 
person who was lying in a bench out of sight who overheard the conversation: Trevor 
Wenzel, the son of Plaintiff s fiance, who later testified to the above described 
conversation (see Aff. of Trevor Wenzel, R. at 892-93, attached as Ex. 14). 
After learning of the conversation from Mr. Wenzel, Plaintiffs Counsel decided 
that action needed to be taken. But, since he entered the Motion to Enter Disqualification 
against Judge Stott beyond the set deadline, Plaintiff withdrew the motion (see 
Withdrawal of Mot. to Enter Disqualification (and request that the Court enter 
disqualification on its own motion), R. at 928, attached as Ex. 15). The withdrawal of the 
Motion to Enter Disqualification was not because Plaintiff changed his mind about the 
prejudicial acts of Judge Stott, but because the motion was untimely. Therefore, in the 
same withdrawal, Plaintiff formally requested that Judge Stott enter disqualification on 
the Court's own motion as is codified in Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E: "A judge 
shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned (emphasis added)." According to Plaintiffs interpretation of 
Canon 3E, it is the responsibility of the judge to dismiss himself in situations where his or 
her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Accordingly, Plaintiff left this 
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responsibility on the shoulders of the Court (Withdrawal of Motion to Enter 
Disqualification, R.928, attached as Exhibit 15). 
However, the Court made no official response to the initial Motion for 
Disqualification or to Plaintiffs later request that the Court enter disqualification on its 
own motion. We assume that the Court decided it was qualified since it continued to 
make decisions in the case on other matters, so to understand the Court's implicit 
decision, we marshal the evidence opposing the dismissal as argued by Defendant (see 
Def.'s Mem. in Opp'n to PL's Mot. that the Ct. Enter a Disqualification (hereinafter "Def. 
Opp'n Dismiss"), R. at 919). 
C. Duty to Marshal the Evidence 
According to Defendant, there are two principal reasons why Plaintiffs Motion 
for Disqualification should be denied. First, Plaintiffs Motion is Untimely. Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 63, states that a motion to disqualify must be filed no later than 
20 days after "the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is 
based." (Def. Opp'n Dismiss, R. at 916). Plaintiff filed his motion on February 22, 2008, 
and made his request on February 29. Therefore, Plaintiff clearly missed any timeframe 
since the alleged ex parte meeting occurred on November 9, 2007. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs belated filing of his motion for dismissal was not 
coincidental. In the time between November 9, 2007, and February 22, 2008, Plaintiff 
actively sought relief from Judge Stott for a new trial. But when he saw that the Court 
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would not yield, Plaintiff switched to his reserve strategy of having Judge Stott 
disqualified (Id at 915). 
Second, the Motion for Disqualification is legally insufficient. Plaintiff attempts 
to show some level of judicial bias through a menial conversation between Defense 
Counsel and Judge Stott. The affidavits collected from Defense Counsel and Trevor 
Wenzel clearly show that the conversation between Defense Counsel and the Court was 
"brief, innocuous, and did not create a reasonable exchange of bias." (Id. at 914) At most, 
Mr. Wenzel's affidavit says that Judge Stott complimented Defense Counsel on her work 
and said that he thought she had a strong finish. The judge concluded with "Good luck." 
(Id) Neither of these statements creates a reasonable appearance of bias on the part of 
Judge Stott, 
D. Analysis 
The evidence presented in Defense Counsel's opposition of dismissal is 
insufficient in its aim. First, as explained above, Plaintiff realizes that his motion was 
filed in an untimely manner, and for this reason it was withdrawn. But, according to the 
previously cited Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E, the judge himself is required 
to enter the disqualification when his or her impartiality may reasonably be questioned. 
Certainly, an ex parte meeting is sufficient to shake one's confidence in a judge's 
impartiality. Therefore, the judge should not have waited for the Motion to be filed, but 
he should have taken the responsibility upon his own shoulders and disqualified himself. 
Further, Plaintiffs Counsel resents and wholeheartedly denies allegations made by 
Defendant which mischaracterize Plaintiff as having used the Motion for Disqualification 
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as a reserve option in case Judge Stott would not offer Plaintiff a new trial. Such a 
personal attack requires a reply. Suffice it to say that the decision to call for the public 
rebuke of an honored official, like Judge Stott, is a difficult one to make. Probably every 
attorney hopes that he or she will never have to take such action and will avoid it if at all 
possible. In thirty years of trial practice Plaintiffs Counsel has never filed a motion to 
disqualify or, to the best of his recollection considered filing one, despite the fact that he 
has disagreed with judicial decisions numerous times as any trial attorney will. But in 
this case the bias throughout the trial was overwhelming, and this ex parte meeting was 
the capstone, and after long and deep thought regarding the consequences, Plaintiffs 
Counsel filed the motion. Plaintiffs attorney concluded Judge Stott's meeting with 
Defense Counsel was a manifestation of the prejudice Judge Stott held throughout the 
trial as manifest when he unnecessarily embarrassed and prejudiced Plaintiff and 
protected Defendant, all of which have an effect on the jury as a whole. Plaintiffs 
Counsel concluded after careful reflection that the meeting between Judge Stott was an 
unguarded moment when Judge Stott showed his true colors because he thought he could 
do it without being overheard. It was a buddy-buddy moment between the Court and 
Defense Counsel. 
This meeting would only be appropriate if Cannon 3B(7) were amended to read: 
It is appropriate for a judge to meet alone with a party of his choice to give 
a case critique and limited encouragement as long as the meeting is kept 
short, and only if the judge expects that there will not be many more 
motions to be decided by the judge in the case. 
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Finally, Plaintiff points out that in the entirety of Defendant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant attempts to play down the occurrence of 
the ex parte meeting as being trivial and irrelevant in nature. But Defendant never denies 
that it happened. The truth of the matter is clear: Judge Stott met with Defense Counsel 
and he offered her "constructive criticism" concerning her performance in the case. Ms. 
Shapiro clearly admits this in her affidavit (Aff. of Ruth A. Shapiro, R. at 921-24). Ms. 
Shapiro also accepts Mr. WenzePs account of what was said during the meeting, that 
Judge Stott complimented Ms. Shapiro on her performance and that he thought that she 
had a strong finish. (Aff. of Trevor Wenzel, R. at 892, attached as Ex. 14; Def. Opp'n 
Dismiss, R. at 914). Ms. Shapiro did not affirm or deny that Judge Stott wished her 
"good luck" as testified to by Mr. Wenzel. But those comments she does admit are an 
unmistakable show of bias, and in any case, they clearly indicate an ex parte meeting. 
Judge Stott violated Canon 3B(7) by holding an ex parte meeting with Ms. Shapiro and 
discussing things pertaining to a pending case. At the very least, this ex parte meeting 
with Defendant establishes sufficient evidence that the Court's "impartiality may 
reasonably be questioned." 
Judge Stott's response to Ruth Shapiro's request for a critique of her case should 
have been "That would not be appropriate for me to do." Or he could have said, "Let's 
get Plaintiffs Counsel who is out in the hall and I will give you a critique." It would 
have been very easy for Judge Stott to invite Plaintiffs Counsel, who was only a few feet 
away out in the hall waiting for a jury verdict to return, to the pat-your-favorite-party-on-
the-back meeting with Defense Counsel. However, it would have been a very 
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uncomfortable meeting for Plaintiffs Counsel as Judge Stott sang praises to Defense 
Counsel. Everyone, including Defense Counsel, would probably have been embarrassed 
by the Court's one sidedness. 
But when all is said and done, Plaintiff believes the Court's behavior not only was 
inappropriate, but was a manifestation of prejudice against the Plaintiff which prevented 
Plaintiff from having a fair trial and the Court should have, on its own motion, entered its 
own disqualification when Plaintiff pointed out the ex parte meeting and requested that 
the Court do so. 
Conclusion 
Due to the trial court's numerous errors in ensuring a fair trial for Plaintiff, and 
because of the numerous irregularities of the trial, Plaintiff requests that the case be 
remanded for a new trial with instructions that Dr. Smith not be allowed to testify, or if 
he does, that Plaintiff be allowed to examine him regarding his employment by Colorado 
Casualty Insurance, and that the case be tried by a new trial judge (Plaintiff is informed 
that Judge Stott has retired so this issue may now be moot). Finally, that the jury be 
asked specific voir dire questions and be instructed specifically regarding prejudice based 
on religious belief and use of alcohol. 
Request for Oral Argument 
Appellant requests oral arguments on this matter. 
Dated this ( day of July 2009. 
Respe/ijftuly submitted , 
Denton M. Hatch, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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THE COURT: I don't know how she got the 
information. 
MR. HATCH: She got the information by taking it 
from files in her office and when--under HIPAA law, my 
understanding is, she is not entitled to take that information 
and use it in another case without permission. I'm saying 
that was in violation of the law. 
THE COURT: I--I don't know if that's a fact or not. 
I don't have--I don't have any information in front of me from 
which I can reach that conclusion. All I know is that 
whatever information is on the pad is on the pad. So, that 
exhibit will not go to the jury and rather than make any more 
of an issue with it with the jury than ha^ already been made, 
I'm instructing both counsel to make no reference to that 
exhibit in--in closing argument. 
MS. SHAPIRO: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: It'll — it'll die on its own. 
Okay. Anything else from either of you? 
MS. SHAPIRO: No, your Honor. 
MR. HATCH: Just for the record, I think the jury 
should know that it was improperly presented to them--
THE COURT: No. 
MR. HATCH: --and that's why it's withdrawn. I 
think--I think they should understand that and I think the 
2 5 I information, if they consider the information on that exhibit, 
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they're considering information obtained illegally, I think 
it's wrong. I think it puts the Court in a hard position 
because we can't research it, we haven't had time, the Court 
doesn't know, not informed on the law, but the Court's going 
to go ahead and let them decide partially on information in 
that exhibit, I don't think she made that great of a point, 
because pain is treated similarly, no matter where it is in 
the body. But--
THE COURT: If she didn't make that great of a 
point, then you don't need to worry about it. 
MR. HATCH: --but I think--I think it's improper to 
let the jury consider information that's illegally obtained. 
That's all I can say. 
THE COURT: I understand. And I'm just say--I'11--
I'll say it again, I don't like to repeat myself, but for the 
purpose of responding, I don't know how it was obtained, I 
don't know the circumstances under which she--she got it and 
whether--whether it was available, whether there was 
violations of any rules or regulations, I have no idea, but 
the exhibit, as it exists, will be put in my clerk's room and 
won't be any place so the jury can see it now. 
I'm not going to instruct the jury any further with 
regard to that exhibit. All it does is accentuate the concern 
that we've all expressed here, that we've talked about in the 
last few minutes and it's absolutely proper and necessary for 
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a judge to instruct a jury when--when there is an improper 
presentation of information to them by way of the Rules of 
Evidence, or what's admissible and what's not admissible and 
then we instruct so that there's no proble|m. 
As I indicated on the record, the reason I'm keeping 
it out is not because that information couldn't be talked 
about and couldn't be used with the expert, it's that it--it 
was handled in such a manner that it was inappropriate. And I 
can't call the jury's attention to that exfhibit and say now, 
the way Ms. Shapiro did this isn't really kosher and so you 
have to disregard it. I'm going to comment upon her 
participation and use of it. That's what you want me to do 
and I'm not going to do that. 
MR. HATCH: I'm concerned that if I can't comment on 
the exhibit, that the jury will not have a rebuttal to what 
they've seen on it. 
THE COURT: Sure, you--they have a rebuttal. You 
had a right to redirect your witness on it. 
MR. HATCH: Well, they won't hav£ an argument about 
it because--
THE COURT: They're not--they're not--they're not 
going to be given it. 
MR. HATCH: But they're--they've got it in their 
minds and unless they're told to disregard it and not consider 
it in the deliberations, I think we have to be allowed to 
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address it in argument. 
MS. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, I would--
objection if, in closing argument, Mr. Hatch 
the exhibit, if he feels necessary, although 
get the same courtesy. 
THE COURT: You absolutely would. 
-I would have no 
wants to address 
I suppose I would 
MR. HATCH: What that does, basically, is--is it 
erases what we're trying to do, I think. I--
THE COURT: Well, you don't--you--youfre really not 
telling me you ought to be able to talk about it and--and 
refer to it and do what you want to do, but she's got hands 
off? You--you--
MR. HATCH: Well, what I'm saying is--
THE COURT: --she can't talk about it. 
MR. HATCH: --if we're going to just let it silently 
disappear, then we just tell the jury not to consider it, we 
don't argue it and it's gone. That--that's what I think we 
should do, because it was information--
THE COURT: I'll think about it. I'll think about 
it. The last thing a judge ought to do is make snap judgments 
about things in particular and we all have to deal with 
decision making immediately in this frame of work, so, what we 
all try to do is do our best to avoid making mistakes and 
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EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY 
Defendant 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
STATE OF UTAH 
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Case No: 050401593 PI 
Appellate No: ' ^ f c & D 3 0 \ 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAY 2 6 2009 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
SS. 
I, KRISTEN ROGERS, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of 
the 4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing and hereunto attached papers and file constitute all of the 
original papers filed in the above-entitled Court and cause, including the 
Notice of Appeal and Minute Entries, and which attached papers constitute 
the Judgment Roll and other papers filed in the above action. 
I further certify that the Judgment Roll and papers contained in 
said file or by me this day transmitted to the Appellate Court, 
of the State of Utah, pursuant to said Appeal. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL of said District Court at my office in 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO, STATE OF UTAH, this 2j^day of / U A ^ , 200J. 
^ H S ^ 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF 
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE JN THE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL CHSTRUCTQQt^toAM 
COUNTY, STAT5 OF UTAK^SS?H?K4fc 
Tab 3 
DENTON M. HATCH, #1413 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
128 West 900 North, Suite C 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
Phone (801) 794-3852 
Fax (801) 794-3859 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 














Kay Armstrong, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I was the juror foreman in the captioned case. 
2. I was present in the jury room during the deliberations of the jury. 
3. One of the problems I saw was prejudice on the part of more than one juror. 
4. Mr. W. Gary Harward came into the jury room and suggested we offer prayer, 
which he wanted to offer and he did so. He came in the jury room with his mind made up. After 
the prayer and after a short jury discussion, he folded his arms across his chest, he said Defendant 
Okelberry was not liable, and Mr. Harward would not budge. 
1 
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813 
5. The reason he said he would not consider changing his opinion was because he 
thought that the Plaintiff Robert Kearl was doing some things in his life that Mr. Harward 
thought were wrong. Specifically, Mr. Harward could not get past the fact that Plaintiff drank 
alcohol and did not hold to Mr. Harward's religious standards, which he cited several times to me 
and once or twice to the jury, even though these facts had no relation to the injury and how it 
occurred. 
6. In comparison, Defendant Ray Okelberry's daughter testified at trial that 
Defendant Okelberry did not drink or smoke. 
7. I told Mr. Harward that I thought the problem was that Mr. Harward was 
comparing what Mr. Kearl was doing in his life with what Mr. Harward thought Mr. Kearl should 
be doing morally. Mr. Harward kept saying that Mr. Kearl did not do what he was supposed to 
do, and he was in effect getting what he deserved. Mr. Harward started with this statement and 
ended with this statement. 
8. In essence, Mr. Harward was judging Mr. Kearl by his own religious standards and 
not with the evidence presented at trial. 
9. I don't think anything else made a difference to Mr. Harward. He did not at any 
time want to discuss with an open mind evidence presented in Court about how the injury 




 LS day of December 2007. 
State of Utah ) 
§ 
County of Utah ) 
Kay Armstrong, upon being first duly sworn, deposes and says that she has read the 
foregoing document and understands the contents thereof, and the same is true to the best of her 
knowledge and belief. 
Dated this 5 day of December 2007. 
fflvnit 
Notary Public/D< eputy Clerk 
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F I L E D 
MAR 1 3 2008 
Karra J. Porter, 5223 
Ruth A. Shapiro, 9356 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Okelberry 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)323-5000 
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EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DEYING PLANTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND FOR 
SJANCTIONS 
Civil No. 050401593 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Division 4 
Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial and for Sanctions came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Gary D. Stott, District Court Judge, on Wednesday, February 20, 2008 at 11:00 a.m. 
Plaintiff was represented by Denton Hatch. Defendant was represented by Kara J. Porter and Ruth 
A. Shapiro of Christensen & Jensen, P.C. The Court, having studied the submissions of counsel, 
having heard oral argument, and otherwise being fully advised in tfye premises, now enters the 
following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, AS FOLLOWS: 
Based upon the Court's own familiarity of the voir dire process in this case and questioning 
of prospective jurors, and based upon the totality of evidence adduced by both parties at trial and the 
evidence adduced by Plaintiff in his post trial motion, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff has 
met his burden of demonstrating that a new trial is necessary or appropriate in this case. The Court 
is not persuaded the Plaintiff has proved the elements necessary for a new trial based upon alleged 
jury misconduct during the voir dire process. 
Further, the Court is not persuaded that any alleged attorney misconduct with respect to 
withdrawn Exhibit 38, which was addressed at the time of trial, is sufficient grounds for a new trial. 
Based upon the Court's own observations at trial, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff has 
had his day in court and received a fair trial. The jury deliberated for a long time and returned a 
verdict allowed by law. 
Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial is hereby denied, each party to bear its own costs and fees 
associated with the Motion. 
DATED this /<£- day of March, 2008. 
Approved as to Form: 
Denton M. Hatch 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the day of March, 2008, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DEYING PLANTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND FOR 
SANCTIONS was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to: 
Denton M. Hatch 
128 West 900 North, Suite C 
Spanish Fork UT 84660 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 050401593 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Division 4 
A hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial was held on February 20, 2008. Denton 
Hatch appeared for the Plaintiff and Kara Porter appeared on behalf of the Defendant. The court 
heard the arguments of counsel and reviewed all of the memoranda relating to this motion, and 
being fully advised hereby enters the following order: 
1. With respect to juror failure to disclose strong feelings and opinions, if it had 
come to the Court's attention that a juror had strong feelings and opinions regarding religious 
beliefs which would cause the juror to vote against a person based on these feelings and opinions 
rather than the evidence, that juror would have been dismissed. However, the Court had no 
indication or evidence in the written response of the juror or in the Court's interview with that 
1 
MAR 1 % 2008 
4TH DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
juror that raised a red flag or even a yellow flag that there was prejudice. The Court had an in-
depth discussion with the juror and counsel had an opportunity to ask questions and he remained 
on the panel. Assuming the juror did as stated in the Affidavit of Kay Armstrong, and that he 
requested prayer and then sat with his arms folded saying that Plaintiff should have no recovery 
and did not participate with other jurors, the Court cannot ignore that the jury came back saying 
no liability. Six said no liability and two said there was liability. The other jurors were not 
affected, they went ahead and honestly evaluated liability. The Court is not persuaded by the 
argument that in hindsight something should have been different. Therefore, juror impropriety is 
not a basis for a new trial. 
2. With respect to the issue of counsel misconduct and hiding or evidence, the Court 
took painstaking care that nothing was said to the jury regarding the exhibit. The exhibit was 
stricken, and the attorneys were not allowed to say anything about the exhibit to the jury. 
Further, the exhibit did not address the issue of liability. There is no evidence that the few 
minutes when that exhibit was presented affected the determination of liability. Jurors were told 
that their responsibility was to find liability before discussing damages. If there is no liability, 
then damages is not an issue. The jury found the defendant not negligent, therefore the jury was 
not allowed to discuss damages. The jury was out for a long time, abput five hours, and six found 
no negligence. Therefore, Mr. Kearl had a full and impartial trial. 
THEREFORE Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial is denied. 
2 
DATED this | ft- day of "fj^A^cJ^ 
Approved as to Form 
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Tab 5 
jury room. Counsel indicated they had a--something they 
wanted to discuss outside the presence of the jury; is that 
right, folks? 
MR. HATCH: Yes. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, sir. 
MR. HATCH: First off, I don't like being deceived 
and I was deceived on Wednesday by Mr. Kearl in Court. She 
introduced an exhibit and--which I had ftever seen, I objected 
to on the basis that I'd never seen, when she questioned Dr. 
France. She showed me part of it and then as she walked back, 
she said, oh, by the way, there's something under this paper. 
I didn't know what it was until she disclosed it, but it was 
confidential medical information and should never have been 
disclosed. 
I didn't have an opportunity to raise that issue and 
I thought the way she did it was sneaky. I think the reason 
she did it is because she was hoping there wouldn't be an 
objection and if you said to her, Ms. Shapiro, don't do that, 
it would be worth it, she thought the point was worth it, I 
think; but I--I, since then, have talked to Dr. France on the 
medical plans, in big letters on the front are the words "This 
shall not be disclosed without permission of the patient." 
And it just so happens that one of those medical 
plans she summarized and published was one of Karen Green, a 
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there was no way I could know beforehand or check into it. 
Now, if Ruth had filed a motion and, you know, like the Court 
has asked, we could have resolved any issues, found out about 
if it was a proper disclosure. 
I--I just think the way it was done was sneaky in 
light of the fact that the Court has asked for full disclosure 
in advance. She--I think she will argue that because the 
names were not disclosed, it's not a violation of privacy, but 
her--her partner handles the case, the Green case that I have 
so what she did probably is, she went to those medical 
records, went through those medical records and then 
summarized them and used them in this case. I think that's a 
violation, my understanding, it's a violation of what HIPAA--
what HIPAA allows. 
We all know that HIPAA law has got layers and layers 
of protection now, for--for medical records and I think, even 
though the--the records were turned over to the firm and--when 
they were subpoenaed, still, that doesn't mean that there is 
an open right to disclose them. So, I'm--I'm asking the Court 
to--I'm moving the Court for an order withdrawing that 
exhibit, telling the jury to ignore what they heard about that 
13 
1 exhibit and that it shouldn't have been presented to them. 
2 THE COURT: Ms. Shapiro? 
3 MS. SHAPIRO: Thank you, your Honor. 
4 First of all, I'm not inclined to have a 
5 professional attack on Mr. Hatch. The Court knows the 
6 progress of this case, what's been disclosed and what hasn't 
7 been disclosed. 
8 This exhibit, as the Court pointed out when I 
9 offered it, is a rebuttal exhibit. It has no names, except 
10 for Mr. Kearl. We specifically used initials in order to 
11 protect the patients. We did not review medical records. 
12 Mr. Hatch retained a professional expert and as is 
13 course, the normal course for any competent attorney, when I 
14 get the case list from Dr. France or from Mr. Ingebritsen or 
15 from Mr. Nicolatus or Dr. Clegg or the other--the other 
16 experts they retained, I go through that list and I contact 
17 people I know who have retained the same expert to see if I 
18 can find impeachment material. And that's what I did. 
19 We got reports which indicate that Dr. France makes 
2 0 the same recommendations, regardless of gender, age, 
21 employment or injury. That's impeachment material. We went 
22 out of our way to protect their privacy by not disclosing 
2 3 their names. This is a chart, it does not delineate, you 
24 know, as I understand with Ms. Green, perhaps hundreds of 
2 5 pages, I don't work on the Green case. dne of my colleagues 
happens to be involved with it. The other case, I happened to 
be involved with. Dr. France's name came up, we made a chart 
for impeachment purposes. That's proper use of impeachment 
material. Nobody's HIPAA--we didn't violate any HIPAA 
violation--or I'm sorry, we didn't violate any HIPAA 
regulations, we didn't disclose any patient names. It--it--I 
honestly wasn't planning to use it as an exhibit as far as 
offering it, but just mainly for demonstrative purposes. 
And at this point, our position is that certainly, 
Mr.--it's a little of the pot calling the kettle black, for 
sure, but Mr. Hatch was not deceived by any manner or means. 
He had the same access to information, in fact, more, because 
one of the people is his own client. This strictly was used 
for rebuttal and impeachment purposes and--and it's our 
position that it's properly used for those purposes. 
Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. HATCH: I think there's an appropriate procedure 
so that we're all not put in this position at the last minute 
after having inadvertently done something that, I think, 
violates the law. And that procedure is to file a motion and 
to see if it can be presented. She knows it's confidential, 
it's in italics on the front page. And I'll fight tooth and 
nail before I'll let anybody lump what I've done in with what 
she's done. It was just plain sneaky. 
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And she had notified us that our medical expenses were too 
high and so we reduced the medical expenses and he also 
reduced a couple of other numbers. Small changes. She had 
had that exhibit and the format for a year. The worst you can 
say I did was give it to her 24 hours late, but she had it way 
in advance and it's an exhibit that she had--she had talked to 
him about in his deposition a year ago. There was nothing 
sneaky about that, I promise to you. A^d I'll fight tooth and 
nail before I'll let the Court, without an objection, say, 
this is a two-way street. This is a one-way street. 
THE COURT: I think it's fair to say that there have 
been, on both sides, untimely disclosure and exchanges of 
information in this case. I commented on the record before we 
left the last time, particularly to Mr. Hatch, as to this doc-
-what's the exhibit number? 
MR. HATCH: 38. 
THE COURT: As to this Exhibit) 38, thank you. 
I have to acknowledge that I was taken back and I 
use the word "stunned" when I saw how it was used. And here's 
the reason. When it was shown to me, it was shown to me with 
the top portion exposed and nothing else on the bottom had 
anything that the jurors were looking at, or that I saw. It 
16 
1 was merely represented to be a recital of his information and 
2 rebuttal exhibit. I assumed it was something that she was 
3 going to be able to have by way of a blow-up size so that it 
4 could be talked with with the jury, as she cross-examined the 
5 doctor. 
6 I was taken back when she started to peel layer 
7 after layer off, of information with respect to other persons 
8 that he has seen. In the posture in which it was done, that 
9 was inappropriate. It was deceptive in nature. 
10 An exhibit is supposed to be disclosed, particularly 
11 to a judge who has to make a ruling on whether it should come 
12 in or not, and you don't hide part of an exhibit and then, 
13 after the exhibit's been received, at the request of counsel, 
14 then start peeling layers off to expose something that none of 
15 us expected. That's why I say I was stunned. That was wrong. 
16 As to the information that was discussed, that 
17 information is appropriate. Expert witnesses can be 
18 confronted about their prior participation, about the--about 
19 the testimony and recommendations they made in the case that's 
20 before the Court and how it's exactly the same as it's been in 
21 other situations with other people; fortunately, one of the--
22 one of the things I was really nervous about, real nervous, 
23 since I couldn't see what it was, it was on the easel in front 
24 of the jury and its back was to me, was whether it had any 









Hatch to know what was on it, I had absolutely no idea what 
was going to happen with it until it happened. 
Fortunately, it didn't have names on it, so it 
didn't show persons, it didn't show identification information 
in any fashion. I looked at that--
MR. HATCH: It did show initials. 
THE COURT: I--
MR. HATCH: And it did show the plan. 
THE COURT: It did show the plan and that's the kind 
of information that counsel opposing an expert witness like 
this is entitled to talk about, but I--you can take an expert 
witness and you can go down deposition after deposition that 
he's given, you can use trial transcripts with an expert 
witness and say, isn't it a fact that in the trial of such-
and-such, you testified this way with respect to a plan for 
care? And you can go right down the line. You can, where 
information has been received, ask expert witnesses--or ask 
questions of expert witnesses to show that the expert witness 
in the case in chief, testifies the same way every single 
time. I've seen it, I've done it, I've seen other lawyers do 
it, both before I hit this posture of the courtroom and when I 
was sitting in your chairs. It's acceptable, but it wasn't 
acceptable in the way in which it was done in this case. 
And the reason it wasn't was because of just what I 
25 I explained, because the full exhibit was hidden from me, the 
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1 full exhibit was hidden from Mr. Hatch. I, as I said, I was 
2 only hopeful that what was underneath it as it started to peel 
3 off wasn't something the jury shouldn't see. I didn't know. 
4 The exhibit won't go to the jury. The information 
5 will remain. 
6 MS. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, can you, just by--just for 
7 record purposes, as I recall, and I think the record will 
8 reflect, and I apologize if there was a miscommunication 
9 regarding the interpretation of the exhibit, that was not our 
10 purpose. When I presented the exhibit to you, it did have two 
11 pages underneath that were covering up the two lower portions 
12 and I'd indicated to you that there was more information 
13 below, so it was--
14 THE COURT: No. I respectfully--I respectfully 
15 disagree with that representation. 
16 Now, that's been a few days ago, you may be right, 
17 but my recollection was that this is used--this exhibit is 
18 being used for rebuttal purposes and there was never a 
19 reference of any nature, of any kind, going to a bottom 
20 portion of information on that document. 
21 I am--I am really a stickler when I deal with 
22 exhibits, because I don't want to have something go to a jury 
23 that they shouldn't see and I find myself--I know I shouldn't 
24 do this, but I do, it's my toilet training, I guess, of 28 
25 years of practicing law and that is that I find myself asking, 
19 
when--when one lawyer will offer an exhibit and the other 
lawyer simply says, no objection, I ask myself almost every 
single time, are you sure you have no objection? Do you 
really know what this exhibit says, without taking a look at 
it? Because too many times, things get put in intentionally 
or inadvertently, that should never be there. 
So, I'm--I'm fairly confident that there was no 
discussion with respect to additional information on it. If 
there had been, that would have been something of note, I 
would have looked and we would have had a discussion off the 
record--or excuse me, discussion with the jury out of the room 
and on the record before we did anything ih terms of admitting 
that exhibit. 
MS. SHAPIRO: Well, I guess we have a constructive 
disagreement, but there--the record speaks for itself. So, 
thank you, your Honor. 
MR. HATCH: May I try to clarify myself just a 
little on one point? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. HATCH: I agree with the Court that an expert 
can be questioned in that manner, that's--that's not what I 
was trying to address. What I was trying to address and I 
didn't say it, so that's my fault, but what I was trying to 
address is, the manner in which she got that information 
violated HIPAA, violated the law. 
20 
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instruction would explain that, why he may have reacted 
differently than they would, including drinking, I think it 
exacerbated that pre-existing condition. I--I use the word 
"condition" is an expansive way. 
The same with 24, a person susceptible to injury. 
THE COURT: Okay. I have those originals and they 
need to go back in the file. 
Cheryl, I'll put them right here with the file. 
Thank you. 
All right. Thank you very mi^ ch, Counsel. Ready to 
have me bring the jury in? 
MS. SHAPIRO: Yes, sir. 
MR. HATCH: Pardon? 
THE COURT: Are you ready to have me bring the jury 
in, subject to dealing with Exhibit No. 38? 
MR. HATCH: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. This is what I have concluded, as 
I indicated to you I would think about it, see where I was 
going to go with it. I'm going to instruct the jury to 
disregard Exhibit 38, that it is no longer part of the 
exhibits that they will be considering and they should not be 
concerned with respect to the reasons why it is no longer part 
of the exhibit. 
The information contained on Exhibit A, for the 
purpose of their deliberations may be--may be disregarded. 
28 
You 're still both entitled to 




























THE BAILIFF: All rise. 
THE COURT: Okay. You may be seated. Thank you 
very much. 
Okay. We're back on the record, the jurors have 
returned to the courtroom, counsel are present with their 
clients. 
Ladies and gentlemen, subject to those materials 
going down the line to you--we're okay--there are two sets of 
jury instructions, the initial ones that I gave you to begin 
with, all of you should have those in your hands, the 
supplemental instructions have been passed out. Before I 
begin to read them, there is one bit of information I need to 
make--to give to you and make a record of. 
I'm to advise you that Exhibit No. 38, which is the 
large blow-up exhibit of comparisons that was used during Dr. 
France's testimony, is no longer an exhibit in the case. 
Since it's no longer an exhibit in the case, you are to 
disregard any of the information from it except as to what Dr. 
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1 France has testified to concerning Mr. Kearl only. 
2 All right. Now, we will go to the preliminary 
3 instructions that I gave you, we're on Page 7, Instruction 15. 
4 Keri, go make another copy, I didn't realize she 
5 didn't have one. 
6 I don't want to have Ms. Thomas looking off of 
7 somebody's, so the bailiff is making a copy quickly. 
8 Until he returns, I'll start, to save us some time. 
9 Instruction 15 on the preliminary instructions. I 
10 have provided you with some additional pages which contain 
11 instructions relating to the particular laws or rules that 
12 apply in this case. Each additional instruction is designated 
13 with the same number as this instruction, followed by a 
14 sequential letter of the alphabet. We will read those 
15 instructions now before completing our reading of the 
16 remaining supplemental instructions. 
17 And I need to get them back from the bailiff and 
18 then we'll start. 
19 For purpose of our discussion here with respect to 
2 0 instructions, let me give you a little bit of background 
21 information, why it's done in this fashion. 
22 Thank you, Taylor. 
23 We have in the law, general instructions and 
24 specific instructions. General instructions deal with the 
25 general operation of the case itself. Specific instructions, 
30 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY, 
called as a witness, having been duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HATCH: 
Q. WW you state your name and address, please. 
A. My name is Edwin Ray Okelberry, Goshen, Utah, Box 
415, 55 East Main. 
MS. SHAPIRO: Make sure you speak nice and slowly 
for the court reporter. She'll let you know if you're going 
too fast. 
BY MR. HATCH: 
Q. What is your relationship with Robert Kearl? 
A. He married my daughter Karen. 
Q. How long have you known him? 
A. I've known him since they got married. 
Q. Do you know how long that is? 
A. No. Probably 18, 19 years. 
3 
1 Q. Have you had any employment relationship with him? 
2 A. Yeah. When he first got married he worked for me 
3 a day — a day or two up there at Silver Divide building a 
4 fence. And then as he got a truck — he drove truck for us 
5 occasionally. I don't know how many times a year. Not very 
8 many times a year. Some years. Not every year. And then 
7 he got his own truck and he hauled a few loads of sheep for 
8 us there. 
9 Q. So he was a part-time employee? 
10 A. I don't know that I'd call it part-time. At first 
11 when he first got married he worked for me. And then after 
12 that we had a little trouble and that was the end of that. 
13 Q. So about how long did he work for you? 
14 A. Well, he worked — he might have worked, you 
15 know — I don't know how much. Not very much. I don't 
16 think he worked four or five days a year for us or five or 
17 six or something like that. 
18 Q. How many years? 
19 A. I can't really tell you. He never was a full-time 
20 employee. He never was an employee. He would go with us on 
21 occasions. 
22 Q. He had other employment? 
23 A. Yes, he had other employment. I t seemed like he 
24 was doing pretty good. And he was willing to come around 
25 and help. 
-22 
u. wnat caused -- go ahead. 
2 A. That's ail I had to say. 
3 Q. What caused the split? 
4 A. What caused what kind of a split? 
5 Q. You said there was some kind of trouble. 
6 A. Well, Bob is pretty independent and a pretty 
7 independent thinker. And he had his way of doing things and 
8 I had my way of doing things. And I was the boss or I was 
9 financially responsible for Okelberry Ranch or Ray 
10 Okelberry's endeavors. 
11 And I couldn't get along with Bob. You know, I'd 
12 tell him to do something and he always had a different idea. 
13 Not always maybe. But on equipment I'd tell him to be 
14 careful and he seemed to think he knew more about the 
15 equipment than I did, but yet I was paying the bills. 
16 And it finally got to the point that I had to tell 
17 him that I didn't want him around. There was just too much 
8 confusion. He'd come up there and jump onto me. And it 
9 wasn't good for my health. I t wasn't good for the ranch. 
0 I t wasn't good for getting anything done. I t wasn't good 
1 for the equipment. I t wasn't any good for him. And then he 
2 had a family growing up and it wasn't any good for them. 
J Q. Do you remember about when that was? 
\ MS. SHAPIRO: When the trouble started? 
i MR. HATCH: When he decided that he didn't want 
5 
Q. So you decided the relationship wasn't good and 
decided to --
A. That didn't cause any problem at all. That was 
just a sore spot. But then when he would get on a piece 
equipment and abuse it I didn't like that at all. 
MS. SHAPIRO: Ray, I want you to listen to his 
question and just answer the question, okay. 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
BY MR. HATCH: 
Q. So when did you decide the relationship was bad 
enough that you shouldn't work together? 
A. I don't know. One time I was taking a shower and 
he came into the shower and thumped me on the chest. And I 
don't know what his problem was then, but it wasn't very 
nice for me. Some old man in the shower taking a shower and 
here's some big husky guy coming down there. I didn't like 
that at all. I didn't want that again. I didn't want to be 
around him after that. 
I don't know if that was the first — I think that 
was before the — I had another incident. He came down and 
he knocks on the door I guess. And I was there and my wife 
and the two daughters was there. And still the same thing, 
fou know, I was a bad guy. I don't know what it was all 
ibout. I can't remember that. But anyway — 
Q. So were you afraid of him? 
7 
1 Bob there. 
2 THE WITNESS: No. The first time I had him 
3 employed I had him up there building a fence with another 
4 bunch of people. They all went over to Eureka and got drunk 
5 and I was very upset about that. That was the first 
6 experience I had with Bob and did not like it. And, you 
7 know, what do you do about that. 
8 They was building a fence up there. He helped 
9 Arlyn or something. Sometimes he was a helper with him up 
10 there on that fence. They chewed up a saddle and just 
11 mismanagement of things. That's all I remember about that. 
12 We got over that all right and went on down the 
13 road and I don't know. Bob we worked him there and we had 
14 him there making those loads of hauling those sheep. And he 
15 hauled some cattle. 
! 16 And, you know, we have to leave pretty early in 
17 the morning. And so we'd try to get there. And we'd get 
18 there and we'd wonder where Bob was. And he'd be the last 
19 one to show up. But yet when we got out there at 200 miles 
20 and headed home he'd be the first one home. And that didn't 
21 set too well with us, you know. He should have been there 
I 22 to start with with the rest. He should have come in with 
23 the rest. 
24 Q. I see. 
25 A. That's the way you run a trucking outfit. 
8 
1 A. I should say I was afraid of him. 
2 0. Physically? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Did he harm you physically? 
5 A. Well, I don't know. Pounding on your chest I 
6 don't know how much physical harm it did. He neyer did 
7 knock me down. He never did hit me. He thumped me on the 
8 chest. 
9 Q. You felt threatened? 
10 A. I certainly did feel threatened and I still tried 
11 to be polite and get along. But it wasn't — I was scared 
12 of him. 
13 Q. Okay. Do you have an estimation of when you 
14 decided to split ways with him? 
15 A. No. I t was after he built his house and he 
16 borrowed our equipment down there. 
17 And that was fine. But they abused the equipment 
18 and I got the equipment back and I had bills on it. And 
19 that was still all right. But it was after that point 
20 that - I just couldn't take the emotional strain. And I 
21 had the kids, you know, they didn't like grandpa and I was a 
22 bad guy and I was this. 
23 MS. SHAPIRO: Ray, do you remember the time frame? 
24 THE WITNESS: I don't. I t was after he built the 
25 house. I don't know how long he's had the house. It's been 
n 
over ten years ago. 
MS. SHAPIRO: Okay. That's fine. 
THE WITNESS: Twelve years ago. If he's been 
married 18 years it's been half of that time. 
BY MR. HATCH: 
Q. So maybe you worked together for nine or so? 
A. I can't say we ever worked together. I never 
really worked together. He helped us on occasions and that 
was it. 
Q. And that would have been for about nine years? 
A. Yeah, probably so. 
Q. Okay. So how would you describe your relationship 
with Robert since you split ways? 
MS. SHAPIRO: What time frame? Now or at the time 
of this incident? 
BY MR. HATCH: 
Q. We just talked about the first nine years that he 
knew him. Now let's talk about the second nine years that 
you've known him. 
A. I t seemed like he got steadily a little worse. I 
don't know. More threatening. 
Q. So your relationship has gone downhill it sounds 
like? 
A. It 's gone downhill ever since he came on board. I 
gave him an opportunity and, you know, he didn't like the 
9 
1 way we did th>. ^s or he didn't like me or he didn't like 
2 something. I was getting older and I didn't need that. I 
3 didn't need it. 
4 Q. Yeah. Why did the grandkids call you a bad guy? 
5 A. Well, I don't know that they ever did call me a 
6 bad guy. But they, you know — 
7 MS. SHAPIRO: I'm going to object to the relevance 
8 of this. You can go ahead and answer. 
9 THE WITNESS: You want me to do what? 
10 MS. iHAPIRO: You can go ahead and answer the 
11 question. 
12 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know that they thought 
13 I was a bad guy. But, you know, you've got your dad at odds 
14 with the dad-in-law or the grandpa. How would the kids ~ 
15 it was always turmoil. The kids didn't dare come around. 
16 And I tried to accommodate the kids. You know, I still do. 
17 MR. HATCH: Excuse me, let's take a quick break. 
18 (Whereupon, a recess was taken.) 
19 THE WITNESS: The grandkids still came around. 
20 They came around. I got along with the grandkids. I tried 
21 to get along with the grandkids. 
22 BY MR. HATCH: 
23 Q. Did you ever hit any of them? 
24 A. No, I never did. 
25 MS. SHAPIRO: I'm going to object to the form, 
10 
relevance. 
THE WITNESS: I never hit one of them kids ever. 
BY MR. HATCH: 
Q. You ever hit one of them with a BB gun? 
A. No. 
MS. SHAPIRO: Object. Don't answer that. That is 
not reasonably calculated to lead to discovery — 
THE WITNESS: I haven't even had a BB gun in my 
hand for 50 years. 
MS. SHAPIRO: Ray, don't answer the question. 
MR. HATCH: I think it is relevant because the 
relationship between the families goes to ~ I think is 
relevant to why their stories are different. 
MS. SHAPIRO: How does the involvement of the 
jrandkids have anything to do with that? 
MR. HATCH: Weil, the close relationship between 
he father and the kids I think is part of it. 
MS. SHAPIRO: He answered the question about 
sitting the grandchildren and I think that's sufficient. 
>Y MR. HATCH: 
Q. Have you ever been convicted of a felony? 
A. I don't think so. I don't think anybody convicted 
le of a felony. You can check the records. 
Q. Were you charged with a felony? 
A. I was charged with the felony. They implanted an 
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1 eagle on my property and I went and picked it up and took it 
2 to the junkyard. 
3 Q. Your understanding is you were not convicted? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. Have you been charged with any other crimes? 
6 A. Not that I 'm aware of. 
7 Q. Okay. Anything else you can tell us about your 
8 relationship with Robert at this point? 
9 A. No. I felt sorry for Robert. You know, if he was 
10 having marital problems with my daughter I couldn't get into 
11 that. And I wish the best of luck to both of them. And I 
12 never really had anything against Bob. I kind of like Bob. 
13 And I can understand a person can get down and out of luck. 
14 Q. Let's talk about -- let's mark this. 
15 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 1 was marked 
16 for identification.) 
17 BY MR. HATCH: 
18 Q. You like Bob? 
19 A. I really like Bob and I still like Bob. 
20 Q. You're pals? 
21 A. I wouldn't say we're pals, but I respect Bob. 
22 Q. You have a good relationship? 
23 MS. SHAPIRO: Are you talking presently? 
24 MR. HATCH: Yeah. 
25 THE WITNESS: I explained that earlier. 
12 4;3| 
2 Q. I'm just wondering if you're changing it? 
3 A. I'm not changing it a bit. I had some compassion 
4 for him and I wanted the best for him and his family. 
5 Q. Okay. So how would you describe your relationship 
6 now? 
7 A. Well, he's got a restraining order. He can't come 
8 around the place. 
9 Q. Your place? 
10 A. Well, he's not supposed to come on my premises the 
11 way I understand it. 
12 Q. Is it your request that he not come on your 
13 premises? 
14 A. Right. It 's my request that he doesn't— 
15 Q. You've told him if he comes on — 
16 MS. SHAPIRO: You can go ahead and let him finish 
17 his answer, please. 
18 THE WITNESS: I've told him earlier not to come on 
19 my premises. 
!0 BY MR. HATCH: 
1 Q. So he's not welcome to come on your farm, right? 
2 A. That's right. 
3 Q. I'll show you what's been marked as Exhibit 1. 
4 Would you identify that for us? 
5 A. There's two trailers that are pretty well alike — 
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1 well, they're e. .tly alike. I bought them from Joe Penn 
2 and I paid that much for them. And it says that I bought 
3 them 3 / 2 6 / 2 0 0 0 and 4 / 1 9 / 2 0 0 0 . They were Army traile 
4 Q. Who is Joe Penney? 
5 A. I guess he's a person from down around Fillmore 
6 something. He bought this — he had those trailers. That' 
7 all I know. He came there one day and wanted — I had 
8 bought some other surplus trailers from the Fillmore area 
9 and I guess he heard about it. 
10 He brought one of these good trailers in there to 
11 me one day. And he asked if I was interested and I told h 
12 I was. I bought one. I said if you can find another one 
13 buy it and he did. And that's the two trailers right there. 
14 Q. Now, you produced this pursuant to our request for 
15 documents relating to the trailer that was involved in this 
16 injury? 
17 A. That's right. One of them is. 
18 Q. Can you tell us which one? 
19 A. I think it's the first one there. The first one 
20 that I purchased, but I 'm not positive. 
21 Q. The amount 2773 on top there? 
22 A. The first one I purchased was 3 / 1 9 - 3 / 2 6 / 2 0 0 0 
23 just a month earlier. Well, it was only 24 days earlier. 
24 Q. Okay. So the bottom one you think is the one? 
25 A. Uh-huh. 
14 
I Q. The one that says 3/26/2000? 
I A. Yeah. They were identical when they came on my 
I property. 
\ Q. All right. 
> (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 2 was marked 
i for identification.) 
BY MR. HATCH: 
Q. Can you identify Exhibit 2 for us? Have you seen 
that before? 
MS. SHAPIRO: You may want to show him the 
complete responses. 
MR. HATCH: Pardon me? 
MS. SHAPIRO: I mean, I had a hard time figuring 
out what was what. It's out of context. So all I'm saying 
is you may want to show him the complete responses. 
MR. HATCH: Do you want me to get it? 
MS. SHAPIRO: I mean, I have a copy with me. I 
just think from a context standpoint it may help him out as 
opposed to one page. 
MR. HATCH: We'll give you a minute to read it. 
MS. SHAPIRO: AH right. Here's the whole 
document. It's the third page of this document. 
THE WITNESS: What do you want me to answer here? 
BY MR. HATCH: 
Q. Is that your answer to Interrogatory No. 3 that we 
15 
1 sent to you? 
2 A. I should say. 
3 MS. SHAPIRO: Do you want to see the question? 
4 THE WITNESS: Well, the question is -
5 MS. SHAPIRO: No, here's the question, 
6 Interrogatory No. 3. He's talking about this one up here. 
7 THE WITNESS: Let's see. 
8 MS. SHAPIRO: He's talking about this part. 
9 THE WITNESS: That trailer I guess that's the 
10 information on that trailer if it's the -- have we got a 
11 photo of that, of the information we took? That will tell 
12 you if that's the same thing. 
13 BY MR. HATCH: 
14 Q. Is that the trailer that you think was ~ 
15 A. I think that's right, but I'm not sure. They're 
16 identical. They're just identical as they can be. And I 
17 don't know what one we had under there — was under there 
18 when Bob requested to put his truck under there. This is 
19 the one we was working on. And the number we got a picture 
20 of it today. I think this is whatever if they took it. I 
21 haven't checked it so I can't agree with it. I f we could 
22 check it against that serial number, then I would agree with 
23 that. 
24 MS. SHAPIRO: I can represent to you it's the 
25 information taken off the plate on the trailer. 
16 2 
MK. MATCH: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: It's a well marked trailer. 
BY MR. HATCH: 
Q. This is the trailer you showed me when I visited 
you the second time out on your farm? 
A. I can't remember exactly the sequence of what we 
went through. But we had two trailers there. And I think I 
told you that the trailer that was under that shed that Bob 
pulled that pin on and got hurt on we had taken it out to 
the desert out where we had put some cement rings on it or 
something to make a spring out there — to fix a spring. 
That's where that trailer was. And then you guys — we 
brought it back in so you'd have it. It 's been in Goshen 
ever since. We only used it one time since this thing 
happened. 
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 3 was marked 
for identification.) 
THE WITNESS: This picture was taken last year 
taken after we had brought it back from the desert. 
MR. HATCH: Right. 
THE WITNESS: So that's the trailer. 
BY MR, HATCH: 
Q. So you're saying Exhibit 3 is the trailer that you 
think was involved? 
A. Right. This is the trailer. 
17 
THE WITNESS: Well, we had that trailer in there. 
We was trying to get it so it was road worthy and put the 
jack on it. There wasn't any way you could manage it 
without a jack on it. 
BY MR. HATCH: 
Q. When you bought it it did not have a jack? 
A. No, it did not have a jack on it. 
Q. So between the time you bought it in March of 2000 
ind August of 2001, which is about a year and a half, it did 
lot have a jack? 
A. I don't know what month we put the jack on. I 
bought it was in the spring that we put the jack on. But 
ve had been working on the trailer when Bob requested to put 
its truck in there. That's why it was under the shed. And 
#e bought this brand-new jack and it had never been out of 
lie shed since we had put that jack on it. We had been 
Forking on that jack and getting it — it was a brand-new 
ick. 
Q. So how long had you been working on it? 
A. I don't know. You know, I don't know how long it 
id been under the shed. 
Q. Were you doing the work or was someone else? 
A. I did most of the work myself. 
Q. So is it this jack in the picture that you 
•tailed? 
19 
I 1 MS. SK. . IRO: Can we go off the record for a 
2 minute. 
3 (Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was 
4 held.) 
5 BY MR. HATCH!: 
6 Q. So Exhibit 3 is the trailer you think was involved 
7 in the injury? 
8 A. Yes, sir. 
9 Q. Okay. And I believe you said you - what did you 
10 purchase it for when you originally purchased it? 
11 A. Just general ranch use. 
12 Q. Give us some examples. 
13 A. You could haul panels on it. You could have put a 
14 water tank on it. You could have hauled a pickup on it. 
15 You could have hauled salt on it. You could have hauled hay 
16 on it. 
17 Q. And do you license the trailer? 
18 A. No. For farm use you don't have to license it. 
19 Q. And not even when you take it to Nevada? 
20 A. No, it wasn't. 
21 Q. And let's go to the time of the injury which was 
22 around September 2001. I believe you said you were working 
23 on it in your shop. Do you recall what you were doing? 
24 MS. SHAPIRO: I'm going to object to the extent it 
25 misstates his testimony, but he can clarify that. 
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1 A. Yes, sir. 
2 Q. And that's what you were — had you completed the 
3 work — 
4 A. Yes, sir. 
5 Q. — when the injury happened? 
6 A. We had it welded on. 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 A. We've never done anything to it since. 
9 Q. Are you familiar with jacks? 
10 A. Very much so. 
I I Q. You've been around them all your life? 
12 A. Yeah. When I went to college I took physics and 
13 geometry and spindles and rotaries, civil engineering. And 
14 I've got some good people that installs jacks and also I got 
15 their information. 
16 And I don't know how many trailers we've got, but 
17 we've probably got 30 trailers that's all got jacks on them. 
18 And most of them we put them on. We've got several jacks 
19 with the same application. At the time that was the best 
20 jack we could buy. We bought it up to Lone Tree. We asked 
21 them if it was the best jack. They said it's the best jack 
22 we've got for that application. 
23 Q. When Robert came to work on his truck did he have 
24 your permission to do that? 
25 A. Well, he had the permission to put the truck under 
20 <>$[ 
i my snea. And this was — happened ae in the stall where 
2 he needed to put his truck. So I don't know if I told — I 
3 can't remember talking to Bob about that. And I don't know 
4 who asked for permission, but I fully agreed that he could 
5 put his truck under there. I t was getting kind of cold or 
6 windy or something and he needed to keep it clean. So I 
7 agreed to it. 
8 And the trailer was there. I never did I don't 
9 think say take this trailer out of here from point A to 
10 point B. I guess he's the one that took the trailer out. I 
11 went up there and the trailer was out. I don't even know 
12 where they parked it. But the trailer was out and his truck 
13 was under the shed, which was what I anticipated. 
14 Q. Was he still working with you at that time? 
15 A. No. He was in the trucking business hisself. 
16 Q. So you had already made your split? 
7 A. Yeah, I told him prior to that. But he was up 
8 against it. He needed a place to fix his truck. So I 
9 thought what the heck. You know, you always try to get 
0 along. 
1 Q. During the time you worked together how many days 
2 a year would you estimate he worked for you? 
3 MS. SHAPIRO: Objection. Asked and answered. 
I THE WITNESS: I think we covered that, didn't we? 
> MS. SHAPIRO: You can go ahead and answer again. 
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And I seen him start to kneel down and I said, 
Bob, don't touch that trailer. Them is the exact words I 
said. And, you know, he was that fast. He was on the way 
and God darn he pulled that son of a gun pin. And that 
trailer is heavy Just like the weight on it says. And it's 
made so it tips ahead, you know, it comes ahead. It 's a two 
axle with a pivot in the middle just like a teetertotter. 
But it's off-center so it falls ahead. 
And down it came on his knee. He kneeled down on 
the ground with one knee and then one knee was upright. And 
the trailer part came down and caught the knee that was 
parallel with the — his knee was up and down and the 
trailer was like a T and the trailer fell on his knee. And 
he had a pair of rubber shoes on and it didn't slide one way 
or the other. And all that immediate weight and his foot 
didn't slide so I guess it went to the ankle where it's the 
weakest. 
Q. Can you -- let's step back just a minute. What 
did you do in preparation for your deposition? 
A. I haven't done anything. I haven't done a thing. 
Q. Review anything? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you seen the videotape? 
A. No, I haven't seen any video. 
Q. If you can mark on Exhibit 3 an X where you recall 
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1 THE Wi iNESS: I don't know if he worked 10 or 15 
2 days a year. He didn't work the same all the time. 
3 BY MR. HATCH: 
4 Q. Somewhere in that neighborhood is your 
5 recollection? 
6 A. Yeah, he could have worked 20 days out of one ot 
7 them years or something. 
8 Q. Yeah. 
9 A. But not continuous. Not bang we're going to do 
10 this. No. 
11 Q. Okay. AH right. Tell us what you remember about 
12 Septembers, 2001. 
13 A. Well, I went to the feed lot and the gate was 
14 open. And I kind of thought that was different, but that 
15 could have happened anywhere. So I went on over to the 
16 shed. And Bob was over there using my torch and cutting o 
17 something. I thought it was the top of a 50 gallon barrel. 
18 I t was something to do with his dog pen or something. 
I 19 And I don't know. We walked in the shed and went 
20 along the side of the trailer. I said, I've got to move 
21 this out. And Bob said, I know how to move it out, or 
22 something like that. And I was in ahead of him and he was 
23 behind me. And the next thing I knew he was headed towar 
24 the trailer, which we was right within two feet of it 
25 anyway. 
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[ 1 Robert being. Just put an X where he was kneeling. 
2 A. Well, this trailer was up in the shed. 
3 Q. Right. 
4 A. And on the cement floor. But it was basically the 
5 same angle and everything. And we had walked along this 
6 side because this side was the side of the shed. I t was 
7 kind of a tight fit in there — two or three feet on each 
8 side. We was walking along the side and he was in back of 
9 me. 
10 Q. Just for the record he's showing that he's walking 
11 from the back of the trailer past the two tires in the 
12 front. 
13 A. This is where it hinges. He had to lift this up. 
14 And he kneeled down — I know he kneeled down. He kneeled 
15 down I think with this left knee and then he left the other 
16 one straight up — it was in the upright position. 
17 And then he pulled this pin. You know, if his 
18 foot or knee would have been out from under the trailer it 
19 wouldn't have fell on him. He had to get down — well, he 
20 did. I guess maybe he could have reached through there with 
21 his hand or he could have got a bar or something to pull 
22 that out, but he didn't. He just reached down there and 
23 pulled it up. And there was nothing — 
24 MS. SHAPIRO: Ray, he just wants you to mark an X 
25 where Mr. Kearl was. 
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BY MR. HATCH: 
Q. Where aiuiitj mv iiiinei Wii'i nit hrirunnij if you can 
mark an X there. 
,, L. I til link he 'was kneeling about right in here I 
think that 's where he was kneeling And he reached under1 
here to pull it up with this knee. 
Maybe it was a little farther ahead right there, 
But: the one that could have been there through here right 
through here I think that would have been it. 
.'t i.»i i.1, *w ii wavy line underneath the jack and an X 
i i i jht -
A I t was to the side of it. He was in this area 
somewhere. I t could have been a little bigger than that 
Q. Okay. Could he have been kneeling over by this 
INI 
Q. :orner here? 
A He couldn't have reached this jack I fe wasn't ovei 
by that corner at all. 
Q. All right. And the corner we're talk.ii ig allboii it 
just for the record is — I'll just put a zero by it. 
There's two yellow lights right here. We're talking about 
this corner here, 
A He was past that corner. He reached this w i th 
his — I think he reached down with his right hand and got 
that. You can't see it here in this photo too good but 
II l l , 
A. No. I don't recall when I first come up if the 
kids was there. I f they were they left. They wasn't there 
when this happened. I don't remember if them kids was there 
and then they come back or not. I know Bob and I was the 
only ones under the shed. When I first came up I don't know 
if the kids were this re or not. 
Q. Okay, 
A. I don't think they were. 
MS. SHAPIRO; It's okay. 
BY MR HA r a i: 
Q. What were you planning to do with the traiiei at • 
the time that the injury took place? 
MS. SHAPIRO: That day"" 
MR. HATCH: Right, 
THE WITNESS: I was planning to do i lotl nil ig with 
it. 
3Y MR, HATCH: 
Q, Were you planning to move it out of the way? 
\ No, not that day. Not at all, no. 
Q. Okay, 
I didn't go up there prepared to move the jack. 
Q. Move the trailer? 
A Move the trai ler, I don't know if I was in my car 
T if I was in my truck. I f you're going to move this 
railer you're going to have to h a w i t inck to biicik IJIIII(II?( 
ere's a rele " ^ e s .- *» i i< r there, 
j ihd : i .e ta'K „ -rout the 
'-•: :*- * ightdown you ve goI: 
_ *.. : t _ rf"«*x* <• *vO * ^r ow where it was 
t it's in a tu ** * * n * * . « vn And he had 
- :*. * r I - . 
Okay. 
And i t is - ,..*. ...<*».<^ «. I t s not r ight on 
« ,nv * **>*» *• -tiler You see it's over there — I don't 
~ * it oi ten inches. 
| 12 HS >H^PIRl/ . - . . . 
13 RY MR MA 
What are * 3vei tl lere? 
A. The jack. 
MS 5 HAP Re 
T'bt -wr* . bs No * l ^ ; a o ^
 3haft of the 
" - H* 
ku k at it if 
j -e i NJX of them or 
II ill111! ' 
-oi 'ten , /one else there but you 
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1 it. So when you let the jack down it hits the back of the 
••vp • n falling on the ground. 
i i i see. 
A. I f it's over a pin so you can move it. I was not 
prepared to move it that day. 
Q in ou didn't have a truck? 
B I don't km IOW if 1 had a truck oi if I had the car,, 
Bi it anyway I wasn't I didn't: go up there explicitly I 
have a feed yard up there and I went up there not thinking 
anything about moving that trai ler that day in 1:1 did plar 
on moving it eventually. 
iQl Okay. So when you said - didn't you say 
13 something to Robert: about moving it? 
14 A. He followed me in the shed and I said, Well • you 
15 know, he had done a good job. He had put the trailer back 
16 where he found it. I said, Well, I've got to move this 
trailer out of here sometime, 
18 i i " v iiii L/UM have lo ninve 't out? 
19 11 11 I s d % h o | II f i J u ii 11 line p r o j e c t a n d t h e n v o u m o \ P 
20 it out and you do something else. I don't know what else -
21 had to do but we service our — somewhat we serwice our 
22 trucks there. At that time we was a little bit. 
23 You know, it's a place where yuu we ijot your 
24 i veldci It's a shop. You manufacture Ihings in Iheie. 
25 We've done a lot of work in there. Sonn-Innes it's been d 
d 8 
i pretty Dusy little place. 
2 Q. So you did not expect Robert to do anything? 
3 A. No. He went in with me and I think he was 
4 enthusiastic. He had been the only one that had moved it 
5 since — you know, he had moved it. You know, to put his 
6 truck in there he had to or somebody had to back up to that 
7 trailer, let it down with that same jack, hook it onto his 
8 trailer, pull it outside and park it, and then go through 
9 the same ritual again to unhook it. 
10 He had to jack it up again, use everything on this 
11 jack to get up so he could pull his truck out from under it. 
12 That was the first time. 
13 Then he fixed his truck and ever how many days 
4 later — whether it was a week or ten days or two weeks I 
5 don't know — then he had — he put it back. That's where 
6 he picked it up so that's where he put it back. 
7 Q. Why weren't you planning to move it that day? 
8 A. Well, maybe it was the mood I was in. Maybe I had 
9 a busy commitment. I can't tell you. 
1 MS. SHAPIRO: That's fine, Ray. You answered his 
I question. 
\ BY MR. HATCH: 
I Q. Now, this trailer has a double axle, right? 
1 A. Yes, sir. 
i Q. At the time of the injury did it have -- to the 
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1 best of your reconection did it have a water tank on it? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. And was this the same jack that was on it at the 
4 time of the injury? 
5 A. Yes, sir. That's the same vehicle. 
6 Q. When you pull on this jack — or the release, 
7 excuse me, does it rachet down to the ground? 
8 A. Yes, it does. I t rachets down — if you hold it 
9 up it will slip clear to the ground. The trailer didn't go 
10 clear to the ground. When you pull the pin it stays about 
11 eight or ten inches off the ground or it would have cut hi: 
12 leg right off. 
13 Q. I see. So if you pull the release describe for us 
14 what happens. 
15 A. I f you pull the release it's just like an 
16 elevator, no stops on it. I t goes right straight to the 
17 lowest thing if you hold it up. 
18 Q. Okay. 
19 A. And where it's exceptionally heavy like that it 
20 doesn't just come down and rachet. I t goes just like an 
21 elevator dropping. That's the way I would describe. 
22 But if you let up off of it - it's spring 
23 operated and if you let up off of it then it's going to fall 
24 in the next slot, which is about an inch or an inch and a 
25 half apart. 
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Q. So it doesn't rachet all the way down then? It 
either falls down or it hits the next slot? 
A. Yeah. I f you release it, it will go to the next 
slot. I f you hold it up, it will keep going. 
Q. All right. So it won't rachet all the way to the 
bottom? 
A. No. I f you release it it will not. I t goes in 
the next hole. 
Q. So it either drops smoothy or it catches in the 
next hole. Is that an accurate description? 
A. I f you released it, it would go to the next hole. 
But if you still keep it released and keep it going until 
you release it, then it will go in that slot. 
Q. I'm sorry, I missed that. 
A. There's six holes up and down along here -- the 
shaft. I f you release it, it releases it out of one and it 
drops. I t 's a heavy trailer so it drops. But if you just 
release it and then let off from it — 
Q. Let go of it? 
A. Yeah. I t 's spring loaded. I t would have went 
into the next hole. 
Q. And stopped? 
A. Yeah. That's the way they're designed. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I t 's a heavy jack. I t 's made for heavy equipment 
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1 like that. 
2 Q. And so in this particular case you're saying that 
3 Robert held on to the release? 
4 A. Apparently he did. You know, he released it and 
5 it didn't stop until it got down to where it didn't want to 
6 go any further. 
7 Q. It went all the way to the bottom? 
8 A. I don't know if it went to the bottom or like a 
9 teetertotter it only went to where it wanted to stop. I 
10 think this metal you see underneath it here you see it wou!< 
11 hit that. But I 'm not sure if the jack if you was on flat 
12 cement or you let it clear down it would even hit that. I 
13 think it still rode above that. Because it just got so — 
14 it only come down so far. But you see it would hit this 
15 part first before it hit this. 
16 Q. Okay. So in this particular case did it rachet 
17 down? Did he take it down in stages? 
18 A. No. He just pulled it and down it went. 
19 Q. And it dropped? 
20 A. Yeah, it did drop. I t was brand-new. I t had 
21 never been used before. 
22 Q. The installation was complete? 
23 A. Yeah, the installation was complete. You might 
24 have welded it up a little more, you know, but it never bent 
25 or nothing. 
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v*. nda you tried it out while ycx, j re installing it? 
Yeah, we t r ied the jack out . 
1
 m moved it up and down and it worked okay? 
i " i ii » We felt conf ident enough we wen t back 
and hought. four or five more of them 
ti MnVfi you had any problems with it? 
A. No. You know, as time goes on they kind of rust 
up a l i t t le bit and you have to service them. But this jack 
was brand-new and it was just taken out of the wrapper. I t 
had never been out in the open. I t had never been out from 
under that shed. 
Q. When you knee! down by the jack to pull the 
release is your knee naturally under it? 
MS. SHAPIRO: Are vou talkinq hv • - - /? 
MR. HATCH: Ye* 
i HI:; WITNESS: N< . « H ,i ; 'H; • ma-t enc. • 
keep your knee out from una^f • hrtvt -^v1 t - ^ J ;KJK -
front. The secret is you have a truck backed up here or 
have this block so it can't come clown, 
BY MR HATCI i: 
Q. Yeah. Just for the record he's pointing to the 
tip of the tongue. 
A. That's right. 
Q. And there's a box underneath the tongue and 
there's a box that hangs down. And he's pointing to that. 
33 
Somewhere like that. 
What were you doing at the time it happened? 
I was telling him not to touch that trailer. 
So you were standing behind him? 
vas standing in front of him. 1 had turned 
•round. We had just walked along the side of this truck, 
uid we had been talking and I didn't have any intention, 
here wasn't a truck backed up to it. We weren't preparer 
o move the trailer. The door in front of this — this 
rhite door on this shed right here it was c losed, W r ' 
i any intent ion of moving that trailer. 
Q. What door did you go in? 
A. There's a side door right to the side of this 
hite door. 
••<»*? 
-• £i i t here. We jus t walked in here. 
e didn' t open this big door. 
Q, On Exhibit 3 he's pointing to the white door 
,•..,.
 r j g n t a b o v e t n e jack o n t n e pjCture, 
Wel l , i t 's over here on this shed that's; part of 
a
 ec >.-*jd. The shop. This is the shop. 
Q. ;-o you were standing where you cO'Uid see clearly 
3t he was doing? 
A. I had been walking ahead of h im. I don't know if 
had hesitated there. But I was orobahiv three feet anea ; 
1 A. No, I 'm ta lk ing about this circle that, you hook 
2 onto the truck, This f i ts over n hull oi i t f i ts into some 
3 kind of a pendulum. We put it owe? J ball H's just a l»ic], 
4 hole like a four inch hole. And i t jus t falls down over a 
5 ball. That was good enough to move it. 
They've got a better hookup to move i t up and dow 
the road. Like if you was going to move i t down the highwa 
or something there's some kind of 1,1 pendulum hitch that 
locks over the top of i t so it can' t come dp off f rom thei e 
But to move the trailer you would just let i t down 
mi thai I t ' s so heavy on the f ron t i t wou ldn ' t bounce off 
fust to move it outside. 
>! Whet e were you standing? 
i t, f was in f ront of it This side of It. 
ill i j . f i > * j U M p u t j 
» ; » » - / » • " " * i i iark it that 
would be <">5 
18 Tl- -' ^ jihead :r *i,~. « jrned around 
* I Q and I lorkeo M tier jett ire -°^dv *o gt - -A- ** -e to move 
it and that's when I said, Bob, don1!: tot jch that ti'rii'er' 
BY MR. HATCH: 
11 liaybe you can put 
was fihuiid of Mm. I doi I't know how far 1 was • 
24 ahead of him. At that time we was pretty close together. 
25 Q. Circle around it where you are. 
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1 of h im. I noticed him. He's fast and I noticed him trying 
.i! to act like ha was getting in motion to touch that jack. 
„"! I""1111 limn .I", 1 didn't want to touch tha t jack. And nothing was 
4 under "t. "'. could see him moving towards that jacK and 1 
5 d idn' t want h im to touch it. I warned him 1 <MII 1. 11 I, 
6 don't touch that trailer. 
7 Q. What way were you facing? 
A At that time I had turned around and 1 was facing 
I!:: ai id I le was coming east to get under the trailer. 
10 CI. So you were facing the jack? 
11 A. No. I was facing Bob. The jack was south. And 1 
12 seen him kind of like he was going down to monkey release 
13 this jack oi whatever his action. And I saw him start to 
14 move He was probably back: here And he started to move 
15 and I had that long of a time to tell him I didn't 
^ hesitate and I said i t plenty loud. 
But anyway at that time w e had been walk ing along 
the side, / .i T ~ijpned around and was trying to make him 
understa-' ; - " ~ ."-• ^ 
20 Q. Okay, So you were facing Bob? 
21 A. Yeah. He was coming east: and I was turned around 
*~* to look at him west . 
I A Do vou recall what leg he injured? 
A Vti J* " thought he kneeled down with his left leg 
find tr idt thing came <iown on his r ight leg. 
16 
i u. so his left knee was on the gi. d and his right 
2 knee was up? 
3 A. That's right. 
4 Q. Okay. After it happened what happened next once 
5 the trailer came down? 
6 A. Well, it was a hell of a thing. You know, I could 
7 see what had happened. 
8 Q. As I understand it there was no ratcheting sound? 
9 A. Oh, no. I t just came down. 
10 Q. It just came down? 
11 A. I t happened in two seconds. I don't know, maybe 
12 less than that. And, you know, if it hadn't equalized 
13 itself it would have kept coming down. I don't think it 
14 ever did hit any of these parts on the cement. That being 
15 the case he could get his leg — if this would have just 
16 dropped right on the cement it would have pinned him under 
7 there. 
8 Q. Did you say anything else? 
9 A. I said, you know, Bob let me get you — I think I 
0 was in the car. I said, Let me get you in the car. Let me 
1 drive you. And he said, No, no. I want to take my truck. 
2 And he hobbled out of there. I t was unbelievable. 
I I looked at his leg. I t all happened that fast — or his 
I ankle. 
i Q. What did it look like? 
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with one knee definitely and one was up. 
Q. Okay. Did you say anything else to him? 
A. No. We was just aghast at what had happened, you 
know. I wasn't going to say anything. The best thing was 
to try to get him some help. I offered to put him in my 
truck or take him in our car. I don't remember which I was 
in. But he was stubborn enough he said, No, I want to 
drive. And he did and I followed him out of the yard. 
Q. Did you drive over to his home? 
A. I went down by there. Yeah, I'm sure I did. 
Q. Did you talk to him there? 
A. I don't remember. But I know we all ended up over 
at the hospital. 
Q. Did you say anything like I'm sorry? 
A. Well, I could have done. I t was a sorry deal any 
of i t Not that I'm sorry or personally responsible. 
I guess by having him up on the property I'd be 
personally responsible. I don't know. I told him not to 
come up on the property. I let him in there to fix his 
truck and after that I didn't intend on him being up 
there. 
Sure I was sorry the accident had happened. You 
know, if he had died or broke his leg or it would have been 
my daughter I would have been sorry. Or his grandkid or you 
or anybody I would have been sorry that thing happened. 
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I 1 A. I t was certainly out of proportion. You could see 
2 what had happened. His leg had been upright and that w< 
3 had hit there. He had these rubber soled shoes on and it 
4 made the grip good. I t didn't slide any way. I t didn't 
5 slide east, west, north or south. I t just stayed there 
6 until it broke. 
7 I guess it could have broke his ankle — not broke 
8 his ankle but broke his leg. But instead of that I guess it 
9 went to the weakest part in the ankle. And the foot stayed 
10 in the position and then his ankle did give. So it slid 
11 over to the side of his foot. And you could see that. You 
12 could see that. 
I 13 He got in his truck and I think he went down to 
14 his house and I followed him on down to his house. I think 
15 the boy actually drove over to the hospital hisself. I 
16 don't know if his wife was working or not. I followed him 
17 on over. And I stopped and told my wife and they came ovc 
18 That's as much as I remember about it. But that's exactly 
19 what happened. 
20 Q. I think you indicated that it was his right leg he 
21 Injured. Could it have been his left? Could you be mixed 
22 up there? 
23 A. I've never thought about it since then. I think 
24 that was the position he was in. I t could have been. I 
25 don't know how he positioned hisself. But he kneeled down 
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1 Q. Thank you. Has there been some confusion in your 
2 mind about which trailer it was? 
3 A. Not one damn bit on my part. 
4 Q. How sure are you that this is the trailer? 
5 A. I'm 110 percent sure. 
6 Q. Okay. Do you remember meeting with me up at your 
7 farm? 
8 A. Yeah, I remember you coming in there one or two or 
9 three times. 
10 Q. Do you remember us meeting last winter when there 
I I was snow on the ground? 
12 A. Not particularly. I remember one time you came in 
13 there with Bob or something. I don't know if I talked to 
14 you that day or not. 
15 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 4 was marked 
16 for identification.) 
17 BY MR. HATCH: 
18 Q. I show you what's been marked as Exhibit 4. Is 
19 that you in the picture? 
20 A. Yeah. 
21 Q. Do you remember that? 
22 A. Well, I remember being there with you. I don't 
23 know if this was the trailer. Is this the trailer we're 
24 talking about? 
25 Q. Well, do you remember showing me that trailer? 
ci y udiier 1 naa up 
2 there 
3
 ; ,---nerr.;••,-• -. -o.vmg me where Bob was standing 
4 when it happened? 
5 A, I remember it just as I toid you. I would have 
6 to id you that then and I would have told you that now. I 've 
7 got no reason — he had to be down there to pull the pin to 
B pull that release. 
9 Q Do you remember how we got up there? 
} A We drove up there in your tn tick: or something 
I didn't we. I don't remember. 
! Q Could it have been your car? 
I * 1 don't know. I don't know when this piciu.«. 
I taken if we had this trailei back, I've only got two of 
» these t ra i lers and the other one had a water tank on it 
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 5 was marked 
ntification.) 
(W h e re u po n, a n < > M M1t» i e t«111J 111 * r 1 1 •." • 1 1 1 1 1 ,
 ( i ' . 
. *.< -^ -e show you what's been marked as Exmui 
* /ou if you can identify that? 
A, Can I identify it? 
Q. Can you identify it? 
A. Sure, I can. If: s my little light trailer. 
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MS. SHAPIRO. Do you need to take a break or are 
you all right? 
THE WITNESS; No, I'm great. 
MR. HATCH; Yeah, holier if you want a break. 
MS. SHAPIRO: Just for the record I would request 
a full set of these pictures that apparently were taken 
during the winter I would assume last year when you were oi» 
Mr. Okelberry's property. 
MR. HATCH: Right. You're entitled to those, 
THE WITNESS: So are you through with 5"' 
BY MR HATCH: 
Q I hrough with 5 unless you can remember anything 
2lse about that jack:. Now, that jack: has a pin that pulls 
)Ut? 
A, t'es. i ns tead of — i t 's not as heavy-duty of a 
ack as t ha t other one. I t 's probably a 3,000 pound jack 
where the other is a 12,000 pound jack. 
""J "lould it have been a jack like that? 
A. No. 
Q Let's look at 6. 
A. Okay. Th i s i s j u s ir • 11 I i»mi i m t • i w a r s u r D I I i s I r 11 i p r 






















M S, :; -\PIRO: I'm sorry, can you repeat what type 
•1E WITNESS: Well, it's a military trailer, but 
a -'ng'e axle trailer, It's one of the lighter ones 
•i • QC ', It's a different kind of jack. It works 
kino *)- on trie same principle but it's not set i ip like this 
"ner <<* 
I nevei told you it was th1-. M^, s, never 
This is the trailer it is or it's this tra^. *
 unnk at 
the time that I was up there with you it had the water tank 
on it, | 
BV MR. HATCH: 
Q. Okay. Pointing to 4 and 3 — Exhibit 4 and 3. 
Is that your walker in the picture? 
A. Yeah, that's my walker. And I know the t ra i ler . 
I know the jack and the kind of a trailer it was on. I t was 
oi i a light trailei 
Q. Do you recall showing me that jack? 
A. Yeah, I showed you the different k ind of jacks 
around there. 
CI Do you f ecall why yoi i showed me that jack? 
A. No. 1 1 » tfo i 10 i eason. Just t o show that there 
was different kinds of jacks. And the t ra i lers you seemed 
to be more interested in all the trailers. There are 
di f ferent k ind of j acks . 





















Is that your car in the picture? 
i ««f « l r . 
U, ukay. Could it have been a trailer that looked 
\b ili.it 
A. Nil his is a single axle t ra i ler . This doesn' t 
even have a jack: on i t . This has got a jack, but it's 
folded down on 1:1 le ground. I t 's laying right straight on 
the ground. 
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No, 7 was marked 
for identification.) 
BY MR, HA1 CH: 
Q. SI IOW yoi i what's beei i marked as Exhibit / . Can you 
tell us what that is? 
A. I t looks like that trailer that we had been 
ta lk ing about. 
- -railer in Exhibit — 
A. I real ly can' t see enough of it But I've only 
got two of those trailers, I don ' t know i f anyth ing is on 
that trailer or not. 
Q. Okay. Do you recall i neasuring from the corner to 
the tongue? | 
n 1 can't: remember that. What 's th is black part up 
here? Whi it's this I >lack pai t? 
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2 A. You know, I don't know which one of these trailers 
3 you're talking about. They're both the same. They'd be the 
4 same measurements. I don't know if that's the water tank. 
5 But if that's the water tank that's not the same trailer. 
6 This is not the same trailer. I can tell you. 
7 This jack is mounted on the other side. This is the trailer 
8 up on top of the hill with the water tank on it. So, no, 5 
9 would be — 
10 MS. SHAPIRO: This is 7. 
11 THE WITNESS: It's the same one. That's not the 
12 trailer it was. You're not showing the water tank on it. 
13 You're just showing a little bit of snow on the front part 
14 of it. This black part is the water tank. I can tell the 
15 jack — this jack — the other jack would have been back 
6 here farther. The other jack was back under these name 
7 plates on it. This is not the trailer. 
8 MS. SHAPIRO: Just for the record he's referring 
9 to Exhibit 7. When he references the jack would be back 
0 further he's talking about just above where the silver part 
t of the tape measure is. 
1 THE WITNESS: No, over here. The trailer that 
\ you're talking about that Bob pulled the pin on is right 
\ adjacent to this right here. 
I This is not the trailer. This is the one that's 
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1 up on the hill w». - this is the water trough trailer. 
2 And I want to make corrections on that other one. It's the 
3 same picture and it is not the trailer. Where is this one? 
4 MS. SHAPIRO: This one? 
5 THE WITNESS: No, that's a little light trailer. 
6 This one right here. 
7 MS. SHAPIRO: Exhibit 4? 
8 THE WITNESS: This one you can't see. I don't 
9 know where he was on this one. With just showing this much 
10 of the trailer I can't tell. You can't see where the jack 
11 is. This picture doesn't give enough detail. But I would 
12 assume it's this same trailer. 
13 MS. SHAPIRO: As Exhibit 7? 
14 THE WITNESS: I think so. You see this black part 
15 I think that's the water tank. And if I remember right it 
16 was up on top of the hill. These two are not the trailers 
17 you're looking at. They're sisters. But one has got a 
18 water tank on it and one has got a flat bed. 
19 BY MR. HATCH: 
20 Q. Okay. We met a couple of times to inspect the 
21 trailer at your farm? 
22 A. I t seems like to me you was up there three times. 
23 And I don't know how many times without me. So I don't 
24 know. 
25 Q. Now, after we've looked at all these your 
46 
testimony is that Exhibit 3 is the trailer? 
A. That's right. And probably last winter when you 
took this picture you went up there and I showed you this 
sister trailer. And it had the water tank on it. I think 
it's kind of coming back to me here. But this trailer was 
out to the desert and they hadn't brought it home at that 
time. 
Q. Exhibit 3? 
A. Yeah. I t was out to Nevada and they brought it 
back. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And it never was there. This is not the trailer. 
I want it perfectly clear that those two pictures are not 
the trailer. 
MS. SHAPIRO: Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 4. Is that 
correct? 
THE WITNESS: That's right. Neither one of them 
shows the tank on the trailer nor do they show the jack. 
BY MR. HATCH: 
Q. Okay. I think we're about done. Let me just take 
a little break. I want to ask him about one more picture 
I'm going to get. 
(Whereupon, a recess was taken?) 
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 8 was marked 
or identification.) 
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1 BY MR. HATCH: 
2 Q. I'll show you what's been marked as Exhibit 8. Is 
3 this one of your trailers? 
4 A. Yes, sir. 
5 Q. I understand you've already stated that the 
6 trailer involved in the accident was a double axle. This is 
7 a single axle. Is that correct? 
8 A. Yes, sir. 
9 Q. After you viewed all of these trailers — and I'm 
10 not trying to put words in your mouth, but I want to make 
11 sure that we understand what your testimony is. Has your 
12 testimony changed? Are you confident that Exhibit 3 is the 
13 trailer? 
14 A. I'm just as sure as you're sitting in that chair. 
15 Q. Okay. Was there ever any confusion in your mind 
16 about which trailer it was? 
17 A. No. I had two of them. That's kind of — no. 
18 One had a water tank on it. One was a fiat bed. You can 
19 see I was in a waiker when I come out there and showed you. 
20 My mind was good. I know which trailers they were. I did 
21 the work on both of them. 
22 Q. You say — 
23 MR. HATCH: Can you read that back. 
24 (Whereupon, the question was read back by the 
25 court reporter.) 
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,,.._ ».A , ,VL.JO. M»IU men i neipers help me with 
2 them trailers, 
3 BY MR. HATCH: 
4 Q Ail i igt it Anything else you can remember aocuv 
5 the accident that you haven't told us about? 
6 A. No. Here you've come in here w i t h , you ,_~ ~ 
7 three different seasons — or two different seasot 
v and that. That was last winter, 
Q Right. 
) MS. SHAPIRO; He's just asking about the accidei it. 
I rHE WITNESS: No, I cant tell anything. 
A^CH: 
l
" jse pictures last winter concern you? 
ve identified them and I know right whet e 




This t ra i le r i t 's — I don't know how many we've 
got of them. We've got a lot of them 
Q A lot of trailers? 
A Yes You know that. And some we use more than 
others. But, you know, everybody we 've probably got 13, 
15 employees and they've used these trailers. 
MS. SHAPIRO: Ray, that's fine. He ha iiniilii 





Q I haven't checked and It could be. There's one of 
these where I took two little lightweight trailers and put 
together. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But it couldn't swing down. So that's the only 
one I don't know wha t jack is on that trailer. 
Q. All right. Okay. Thank you. 
MS. SHAPIRO: You're done. We'll reserve the 
right to read and sign. You can send it to me. 
(Whereupon, the deposition concluded ,- > 
2 Q. Do you use the jack the type of jack that's on 
3 Exhibit 5 do you use that type of jack anymore? 
4 Yesr we do use that type of jack. That's a 
. *u. yjck than on that big heavy trailer. 
ou use that only on single axle? 
/e've been known to put heavy jacks on l ighter 
8 trailers. 
9 Q. I mean tl lis jack on Exhibit 5. 
10 A. That's a — see you don ' t show r I In- h i i l n p I I I, 
1  ! Ibbi i l « a sir t j l t , ii*!.,,, 
12 Q. is il only on single axles? 
13 A No, W> vc got: one whei e I took two of the 
trailers and welded them together But they'i e st i l l 
lightweight. This is a l i gh twe igh t jack I t ' s a medium 
weight jack, 
Q So you 1 lave one double axle trailer that has a 
^ck like shown in Exhibit 5? 
MS, SHAPIRO: Object to the extent it misstates 
»-• • • n y . 
I HE WH N" " \ 
>u ask? 
. m dskir* '' you have a double axle trailer that 
,-.r ar the jack in Exhibit 5? 
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1 these were all provided ,t• •»M; i V • **: • n. 
2 MR. HATCH: Okay. So you've got about an., inch 
"' \ i M ill! tltC II. ( I l l l l Hi '" ' 
1 MS. SHAPIRO: Or less. It looks like certainly 
*
 u :s surgical record1" frop- Dr. McArthur: Dr. Clegg's records; 
7 BY MR. HATCH: 
8 Q. A 1.1 right. So you. reviewed some of those 
9 records ~ 
* Yes. 
11 Q. — \ v hei I the) were sent to ) oi I? 
12 Tell us what ~ let's step back a minute and talk 
13 about your background. Do you. have any expertise in 
1 I j i i i i foniy? 
15 MS. SHAPIRO: I'm going to object, to the extent it 
", H a'iV". I'OV a legal conclusion whether or not "he's an expert. 
17 i k can describe his background. 
18 THE WITNESS: Well, I minored in bioengineering 
19 li v hen I was getting i n> Ph.D. at I Iiiiversit;; r of I exas, That 
20 meant that 1 had to take three courses that dealt with -
21 graduate level courses that dealt with bioengineering 
22 issues. Anatomy was not a focal point of that. 
23 I took a systemic physiology class. I took a 
24 neurophysiology of movement class. And I took a 
25 biomechanics class. That was a class team taught by two 
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1 mechanical engineers and an orthopedic surgeon that tean} 
2 taught this biomechanics class. 
3 That class probably relates more closely to the 
4 aspects of this. If you're looking for training that would 
5 relate to this accident that's probably the most specific. 
6 BY MR. HATCH: 
7 Q. The biomechanics class? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. You had one class? 
10 A. Well, it was a graduate level class focused on 
11 biomechanics. I've had a lot of mechanics courses and otl^er 
12 kinds of things and I've taught mechanics courses. But th^t 
13 one was specifically a biomechanics class that focused on 
14 these kinds of issues. 
15 Q. So when did you have the biomechanics class? 
16 A. That was probably 1972, something like that. I'm 
17 not sure exactly without going back to transcripts. 
18 Q. That was one semester? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Have you had any other biomechanics classes? 
21 MS. SHAPIRO: That he's taken or taught? 
22 MR. HATCH: Taken. 
23 THE WITNESS: I don't recall any other classes 
24 that I've taken that were called biomechanics. I've taken 
25 several mechanics classes. 
DANIELLE LITTLE -- DEPOMAXMERIT 16 
5 BY MR. HATCH: 
6 Q. Do you hold yourself out as having expertise 
7 regarding the knee j oint? 
8 MS. SHAPIRO: Same objection. Overbroad, object 
9 to the form. 
10 BY MR. HATCH: 
11 Q. You can answer even though she objects. 
12 A. My first impression would be, no, probably not. I 
13 don't study the knee joint in great detail. However, I do 
14 remember in the biomechanics classes spending quite a bit'of 
15 time talking about the knee joint. It's interesting how low 
16 in friction the knee j oint is for example. 
17 So there's some aspects of the knee joint that I 
18 might understand as well or better than some others. But 
19 the knee joint in general is something that I don't spend a 
20 lot of time focusing on, no. 
21 Q. How about the hip? Same with the hip? 
22 A. Same answer. 
23 Q. How about the talor joint? 
24 A. Same answer. 
25 MS. SHAPIRO: Same objection. Continuing 
DANIELLE LITTLE -- DEPOMAXMERIT 19 
23 
1 objection on this line of questions. 
2 BY MR. HATCH: 
3 Q. So is the reason that you got a printout of the 
4 ankle joint from the Internet was that to refresh your 
5 understanding of the ankle so that you could — 
6 A. In part, yes. 
7 Q. What do you mean in part? 
8 A. Well, to refresh me and to also it looked like a 
9 nice diagram that could be used to refresh all of us if we 
10 wanted to talk about it. 
11 Q. Okay. Anything else you can think ofthat you did 
12 in preparation for your opinion other than what we've talked 
13 about? I guess we could talk about this. 
14 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 2 was marked 
15 for identification.) 
16 BY MR. HATCH: 
17 Q. I'll show you what's been marked as Exhibit 2. 
18 Can you tell us what that is? 
19 A. This is a description and I guess instructions 
20 regarding a jack that is similar to the jack that was 
21 involved in this accident. And this was part of 
22 Mr. Ingebretsen's file I believe. And that's where I got it 
23 was from his — either his file or report. I'm not sure 
24 which. 
25 Q. Did you review it and use it in forming your 
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1 opinion? 
2 A. I did. 
3 Q. Other than the ankle did you study any other body 
4 parts in preparation for your opinion? 
5 A. Not specifically for, you know, this opinion. You 
6 know, I don't know what - I'm not sure what you're 
7 referring to or what other body parts -
8 Q. The hip joint, the taler joint did you study 
9 either of those in preparation for your opinion? 
10 A. No, I didn't specifically focus on studying any 
11 joints in particular. Other than the ankle joint which is 
12 where the injury occurred. 
13 Q. Now, let's talk about your opinion for a minute. 
14 In your opinion you use some words I'd like to understand 
15 how you use them. One is likely and not likely. Can you 
16 tell us what you mean when you use those words? 
17 MS. SHAPIRO: Object to the form. 
18 THE WITNESS: I think that's self-explanatory. 
19 Don't those words have meaning to you? 
20 BY MR. HATCH: 
21 Q. Yes. I'm wondering if they have the same meaning. 
22 What do you mean when you say likely? 
23 MS. SHAPIRO: Well, I'm going to object. It's 
24 vague. It's ambiguous. It's out of context. 
25 BY MR. HATCH: 
DANIELLE LITTLE -- DEPOMAXMERIT 21 
Tab 9 
conflict, because--and Ray didn't pay for Dr. Smith, he didn't 
even know who Dr. Smith was and he didn't care what Dr. Smith 
was going to say. Can you--and you saw me, when I asked him, 
do you know what Dr. Smith's opinion is, he said no, and I--I 
thought--I was taken back, I didn't know what to say. I 
couldn't imagine a party coming to trial and not knowing what 
their expert was going to say. Ray had no idea what Dr. Smith 
was going to, say. It just took me back, I--I stuttered, you 
saw me stutter. And so, Ray didn't pay for Dr. Smith. The--
let's just say, someone on the defense team paid for Dr. 
Smith--
MS. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, I'm sorry, we're treading 
on some pretty thin ground right now. 
THE COURT: Don't discuss that anymore, Mr. Hatch. 
It's already been established counsel hired him. Don't go any 
further with it. 
MR. HATCH: Counsel hired Dr. Smith. And I--I 
didn't think I was going any further, but, so there's a 
dispute. 
When Ray was frozen in place with that video, he 
still--he thought, at the time, it was the right knee and 
remember, right is wrong, it was the left knee. And as it 
became apparent, as the case progressed and it became apparent 
that the left knee was involved and the left knee wasn't in as 
good a place to be injured, just remember, Ray is the second 
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EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY, 
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MINUTES 
FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 
Case No: 050401593 PI 
Judge: GARY D STOTT 
Date: October 24, 2007 
Clerk: keris 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): DENTON M HATCH 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RUTH A SHAPIRO 
Audio 
Tape Number: 07-403-53 Tape Count: 9:02-10:28 
HEARING 
This matter comes before the Court for a final pretrial 
conference. There are several issues to be addressed by the Court 
and counsel. Mr. Hatch indicates the status of mediation. Ms. 
Shapiro in response. 
Ms. Shapiro addresses her objections to Plaintiff's exhibits. Mr. 
Hatch in response. 
The Court indicates that a summary of medical expenses will be 
accepted. However, all itemized expenses must be agreed to by both 
parties. The Court will exclude the medical records themselves. 
As to damages, the Court will allow that exhibit only for 
illustrative purposes. 
The Court orders that no evidence or arguments regarding 
Plaintiff's plans for any money received will go to the jury. 
The Court goes through the pictures Plaintiff intends to submit. 
The pictures will be marked as A through whatever appropriate 
letter it ends on. The photo showing the trailer tongue will be 
pulled, and 2 other photos will need proper foundation. 
Exhibit 25 will be allowed. 
The Court and counsel discuss the questionnaire that will be given 
Page 1 
Case No: 050401593 
Date: Oct 24, 2007 
to the jury panel. 
Two motions in limine are addressed: the motion in limine 
regarding Dr. Craig Smith, and the motion in limine regarding 
Colorado Casualty. Mr. Hatch and Ms. Shapiro present their 
arguments. 
The Court indicates that counsel will be subject to the rule 
compliance. The experts may testify in accordance with those 
guidelines. Plaintiff may not bring in Colorado Casualty. 
The motion in limine regarding the children's testimony is 
addressed by Ms. Shapiro and Mr. Hatch. 
The Court orders that the children may testify as to their 
father's physical damages, but no testimony touching on people 
lying will be allowed. 
The motion in limine regarding Plaintiff's felony charges is 
addressed. Ms. Shapiro and Mr. Hatch present their arguments. 
The Court finds that the prejudicial effects of such testimony 
outweighs the probative value. This issue will not be addressed to 
the jury. 
Plaintiff's motions in limine are addressed by Mr. Hatch and Ms. 
Shapiro. 
The Court orders that the misdemeanors will not be testified to, 
as will the testimony of the wife and children relating to the 
issues discussed. 
There is further discussion with the Court and counsel regarding 
the scheduling and jury instructions of the trial. Court is in 
recess. 
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1 exhibit, your Honor. 




to look at 
MS. SHAPIRO: It is a summary of his 
recommendations, which he's just testified to. 
THE COURT: You may use it. It's received. 
MS. SHAPIRO: In all fairness, your Honor, there is 
more information underneath that I'm going to get into. 
Q (By Ms. Shapiro) Dr. France, if you could--I want 
you to make sure that you get a look at this as well, to be 
fair and make sure it's accurate. We've marked as Exhibit 
38--
THE COURT: Let's have him come down to it so he can 
see it. 
MS. SHAPIRO: Sure. Come on down. Thank you. And 
just make sure you don't block out--thank you. 
5 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I apologize. 
Q (By Ms. Shapiro) We made a summary of your 
recommendations and we've listed out, and this is from your 
report, of the secondary work limitations and the out-patient/ 
in-patient, after care, massage therapy, sleep study, all the 
way across the board and the costs that you have testified to. 
Do they look generally accurate to you? 
MS. SHAPIRO: Denton, can you--Mr. Hatch, can you 
make sure you don't--thank you. 
THE WITNESS: That seems to be accurate. 
MS. SHAPIRO: Okay. 
Q (By Ms. Shapiro) Why don't you go ahead and take a 
seat, please? 
I'm going to hand you a report from another 
evaluation you've done, Dr. France, and I don't want you to 
say the name of the patient, for privacy reasons. Do you 
recall conducting an evaluation of a woman involved in an auto 
accident, age 65, who injured her shoulder? 
A Yes. 
Q And you were retained by that woman's attorney; 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And you drafted a report in that situation? 
A I did. 
Q Okay. And the 65-year-old woman with a shoulder 
6 
injury was a retired school teacher; correct? 
A In this instance, yes 
Q Okay. And why don't you go ahead and come down here 
and you can bring that report. I want to make sure we're 
accurate. We've gone through the same categories here for 
that woman. And based on your report, do these numbers look 
accurate? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Go ahead and take a seat, please. 
Let me hand you a report from another patient of 
yours, and again, please don't mention a name. 
In fact, in this situation, that's a client of Mr. 
Hatch's; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And you did a similar evaluation of that 
woman as well? 
A Yes. 
Q And she was a 40--49-year-old woman with a head 
injury who was unemployed at the time; is that correct? 
MR. HATCH: I'll object to these exhibits on the 
grounds that they could have been provided to us, they were 
foreseeable before this. 
THE COURT: The objec--and so what is your 
objection? 
MR. HATCH: My objection is that since they weren't 
7 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
(Prior proceedings recorded but not transcribed.) 
November 5, 2 007, 10:49 a.m. 
THE COURT: Mr. Harwood? Have a seat right there, 
will you, sir? 
MR. HARWOOD: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
Just one area of questions on--on your follow-up for 
information on Question 7. I'll read that question--
MR. HARWOOD: Okay. 
THE COURT: --and then your answer as well--
MR. HARWOOD: Okay. 
THE COURT: --and then tell you what I--what I need 
to visit with you about. 
MR. HARWOOD: Yes. 
THE COURT: The question says, so you have any 
feelings as to people who file civil lawsuits as a means of 
resolving disputes? 
And you put, and under "Favor", "Yes, if needed." 
MR. HARWOOD: Well, from my understanding, what I 
was thinking, that if you need to settle it this way rather 
3 
than as a neighborly communication, then, if that's 
appropriate, why civil courts would be a desirable thing. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Let me follow up. The law permits people who are in 
dispute over whatever the issue may be to request a jury and 
to have jurors of their peers listen to the evidence and then 
make a decision based upon the evidence they're given in the 
courtroom and the law that the Judge gives the jurors as to 
how the case should go and the jury makes the decision. 
Do you believe that you could be, if you're chosen 
as a juror, fair and impartial to both sides and listen to all 
the evidence and the law that I would give you? 
MR. HARWOOD: I'm sure I could. 
THE COURT: Would you be willing to do so? 
MR. HARWOOD: I would. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Mr. Hatch? 
MR. HATCH: I have no other questions. 
THE COURT: Ms. Shapiro? 
MS. SHAPIRO: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
MR. HARWOOD: Thank you. 
THE COURT: You're welcome. 
(Further proceedings recorded but not transcribed.) 
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DENTON M. HATCH, #1413 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
128 West 900 North, Suite C 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
Phone (801) 794-3852 
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EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DENTON M. HATCH 
Case No. 050401593 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Division 4 
Denton M. Hatch, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am Plaintiffs counsel in the captioned case. 
2. After the jury rendered its verdict I contacted juror W. Gary Harwood by 
telephone. 
3. I recorded the conversation between him and myself which was very short. I have 
a copy of that recording in my possession. 
4. My conversation with Mr. Harwood went as follows: 
Hatch: Good morning is this Mr. Harward? 
Harward: Yes. 
1 
4TH o i | \ , ?? H U R T 
Hatch: This is Denton Hatch calling. Do you know who I am? 
Harward: Yes, I do. 
Hatch: I am calling to see if you might be willing to talk to me about the trial last 
week. 
Harwood: I don't think so. I think it is over. I don't have anything to explain. 
DATED this 
State of Utah ) 
§ 
County of Utah ) 
And I think I had help making the decision. Thank you for calling, 
day ori^TITbfer 2007. fl 
I \ I 
6LS 
Denton Hatch 
Denton Hatch, upon being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he has read the 
foregoing document and understands the contents thereof, and the same is true to the best of his 
knowledge and belief. 
Dated this (j? day of November 2007. 
£ fPVftd Hb, 
Notary Public/DepiAy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Denton 
M. Hatch on this W day of November 2007 to the following: 
Ruth A. Shapiro 
Christensen & Jensen, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 




DENTON M. HATCH, #1413 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
128 West 900 North, Suite C 
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Phone (801) 794-3852 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 








Case No. 050401593 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
pivision 4 
Trevor fceuciizcl, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am the son of Lana Marshall, who is Robert Kearl's fiancee and who is the 
plaintiff in this case. 
2. lam 15 years old. 
3. I attended the trial in the captioned case. 
4. During the jury deliberation I was the only person from the audience in the 
courtroom. Defense counsel and Defendant were also in the courtroom at their table. Plaintiff 
and Plaintiffs counsel and all of the audience were gone. 
5. I talked briefly to Defendant's counsel about sports. Then I laid down on the 
1 
bench to send a text message to a friend. 
6. At that time Judge Stott walked over to defense counsel's table and complimented 
defense counsel on her work in the case and said that he thought she had a strong finish. 
7. The Judge then said, "Good luck." 
8. I don't think that the Judge saw me because at the time he came to defense 
counsel I was laying in a bench in the audience section of the courtroom, but I was close enough 
that I could hear clearly. 
DATED this Z\ day of February 2008. 
State of Utah ) 
§ 
County of Utah ) 
Trevor fccnenzef 
Trevor Leuenzel, upon being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he has read the 
foregoing document and understands the contents thereof, and the same is true to the best of his 
knowledge and belief. 
Dated this M day of February 2008. 
Notary Public 
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EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY, 
Defendant. 
WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION 
TO ENTER DISQUALIFICATION 
Case No. 050401593 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Division 4 
Plaintiff hereby withdraws his motion to enter disqualification because it was not filed 
timely. Although the motion is withdrawn, the court's actions as outlined in the affidavit filed 
with Plaintiffs motion to enter disqualification shows bias. Plaintiff believes that the court should 
enter disqualification on the court's own motion even though Plaintiff has withdrawn his motion. 
As stated in Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 E: 
A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including...the judge has a personal 
bias... 
Defendant's counsel's affidavit is further evidence of the Judge's bias. She states that 
Judge Stott met ex parte with her, gave her a "critique" of her performance at trial and 
1 
complimented her on her "reasoning" and "presentation." Defense counsel argues that Judge 
Stott's statement of "good luck" was a pleasantry and not a show of bias. Plaintiff sees it 
differently. Plaintiff sees it as an unmistakable show of bias. In any event, it was all inappropriate 
under Canon 3 and presents a situation in which the judge's impartiality is reasonably questioned.1 
The court's meeting with defense counsel ex parte also violates Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Cannon 3 B.(7): 
..Except at authorized by law, a judge shall neither initiate nor consider, and 
shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or 
impending proceeding... 
No doubt, the reason for the strictness of this rule and the lack of numerous exceptions, is 
the fact that it is a clear show of bias, and encourages conversations like the one involved here. 
Once again, Defense counsel admits that the ex parte meeting took place, although she argues that 
it was unintentional and harmless. How hard would it have been to include Plaintiff and Plaintiffs 
counsel who were in another room? If Plaintiff was included would the judge have given defense 
counsel a critique of her performance and complimented her and wished her "good luck"? Would 
the judge have done it if he knew that Plaintiffs step son was laying down in the bench out of 
xThe ex parte meeting is consistent with the prejudice Plaintiff experienced during the 
trial. Embarrassing Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel unnecessarily, making what Plaintiff believed 
to be unfounded rulings, and protecting the Defendant whenever possible all add up to prejudice 
by the Court that influenced the trial and the jurors. However, these actions are difficult to 
describe and evaluate, even though they add up cumulatively to a result which is significant. 
When the ex parte meeting took place it was a clear manifestation of the prejudice which 
Plaintiff believed he experienced during the trial and gave Plaintiff a concrete example of the 
Court's prejudice. 
2 
sight close by? It is doubtful. The fact that the Judge thought that Plaintiff was not present gave 
him liberty to express his true feelings and he took the opportunity. 
Perhaps the judge thought that the case was over. However, the fact that the case was still 
"pending" is clearly shown by the record. The motions filed and decisions made indicate the case 
was not over and is ongoing. 
Therefore, even though the Plaintiff withdraws his motion, the Court should enter 
disqualification as required by the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
DATED this ^ 7 day of February 2008. 
Denton M. Hatch 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed and faxed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Withdrawal of Motion to Enter Disqualification on this ^f day of February 2008 to the 
following: 
Ruth A. Shapiro 
Christensen & Jensen, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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